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Double	  Debunking:	  Modern	  Divination	  and	  the	  End	  of	  Semiotics.	  
	  
	   “An	  fortasse	  ordinem	  non	  diligit	  anima	  illis	  etiam	  numeris	  sensualibus	  attestantibus.”	  Augustine,	  De	  Musica,	  6,	  14,	  47	  
	  
	  
1.	  Introducing	  semiotics.	  	  Semioticians	  dread	  being	  introduced	  to	  a	  new	  person,	  and	  being	  asked	  about	  their	  job.	  “I’m	  a	  semiotician”,	  they	  hastily	  answer,	  but	  they	  know	  that	  they	  will	  go	  through	  the	  usual,	  frustrating	  experience:	  reactions	  on	  the	  interlocutor’s	  face	  will	  span	  from	  puzzlement	  to	  actual	  fear,	  according	  to	  a	  nuanced	  typology	  that	  consummate	  party-­‐goers	  semioticians	  are	  all	  too	  familiar	  with.	  Some	  people	  will	  briefly,	  nervously	  nod,	  then	  change	  subject,	  as	  if	  they	  had	  just	  been	  answered:	  “I’m	  an	  undertaker”.	  They	  don’t	  know	  what	  a	  semiotician	  is,	  but	  are	  afraid	  to	  ask,	  for	  several	  reasons:	  they	  don’t	  want	  to	  show	  their	  ignorance,	  they	  are	  scared	  to	  be	  given	  a	  lengthy	  reply	  on	  an	  abstruse	  occupation,	  but,	  most	  of	  all,	  they	  think	  that	  if	  they	  don’t	  know	  even	  the	  name	  of	  a	  job,	  then	  that	  job	  is	  essentially	  useless	  for	  society,	  and	  who	  has	  it	  is	  a	  loser;	  no	  reason	  to	  enquire.	  Unfortunately,	  though,	  that	  is	  not	  the	  worst	  category	  of	  conversation	  partners	  a	  semiotician	  can	  have.	  There	  is	  much	  worse,	  like	  those	  who	  will	  bluntly	  ask,	  apologizing	  for	  their	  ignorance	  with	  a	  smirk	  on	  their	  face:	  “And	  what	  is	  a	  semiotician?”.	  There	  is	  something	  more	  excruciating	  than	  having	  a	  job	  that	  nobody	  knows	  about.	  It	  is	  having	  a	  job	  whose	  description	  requires	  at	  least	  a	  two-­‐hour	  academic	  lesson.	  But	  if	  the	  semiotician	  tries	  the	  long	  way,	  if	  he	  or	  she	  embarks	  on	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  about	  the	  specificity	  of	  semiotics,	  the	  result	  will	  be	  disheartening:	  after	  a	  few	  minutes,	  interlocutors	  will	  repress	  a	  yawn,	  nervously	  looking	  for	  an	  escape,	  dying	  for	  someone	  to	  set	  them	  free	  from	  such	  torturous	  conversation.	  Sadly,	  semioticians	  are	  usually	  so	  attentive	  to	  details	  and	  so	  able	  to	  decipher	  them	  that	  these	  expressions	  of	  impatience	  and	  boredom	  won’t	  go	  unnoticed.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  third	  category	  of	  party	  interlocutors,	  the	  worst	  of	  them	  all.	  These	  are	  people	  who	  vaguely	  know	  what	  semiotics	  is	  about,	  but	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  despise	  it,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  despise	  semioticians,	  and	  are	  eager	  to	  find	  the	  most	  sarcastic	  way	  to	  convey	  their	  contempt.	  One	  of	  their	  usual	  lines	  will	  go:	  “ah,	  semiotics,	  that	  was	  famous	  in	  the	  1970s,	  isn’t	  it?”,	  which	  means	  that	  semioticians	  are	  old-­‐fashioned	  losers,	  people	  too	  stupid	  to	  realize	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that	  the	  world	  of	  ideas	  moved	  forward,	  toward	  new	  enchantments,	  and	  are	  still	  sticking	  to	  old	  mantras,	  like	  people	  wearing	  their	  grandparents’	  clothes	  at	  a	  cool	  party.	  This	  third	  category	  also	  admits	  a	  variant:	  people	  who	  will	  not	  deem	  semioticians	  as	  people	  stuck	  in	  time,	  but	  as	  people	  stuck	  in	  space.	  Their	  typical	  reply	  will	  be:	  “oh,	  semiotics,	  that	  is	  popular	  in	  Italy,	  isn’t	  it?”,	  which	  actually	  means	  “what	  you	  do	  is	  the	  academic	  equivalent	  of	  lasagna,	  you	  can	  try	  to	  make	  it	  sound	  global	  as	  much	  as	  you	  want,	  it	  will	  always	  smell	  of	  your	  mom’s	  kitchen”.	  That	  is	  the	  typical	  answer	  of	  most	  Anglo	  academics.	  By	  it,	  they	  will	  surmise	  not	  only	  that	  semiotics	  is	  a	  local	  academic	  dish,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  could	  never	  enter	  the	  menu	  of	  global,	  that	  is,	  Anglo,	  education.	  Philosophy,	  history,	  geography,	  even	  rhetoric	  are	  admissible,	  but	  semiotics	  is	  definitively	  Latino,	  or	  continental	  at	  the	  most.	  Frustrated	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  social	  experience,	  many	  semioticians	  give	  up.	  They	  start	  to	  lie.	  Their	  answer	  will	  change	  according	  to	  who	  their	  interlocutors	  are,	  or	  according	  to	  whom	  they	  think	  their	  interlocutors	  are.	  They	  will	  range	  from	  something	  very	  general,	  like	  “I’m	  a	  philosopher”,	  to	  something	  more	  specific	  but	  actually	  insincere,	  like	  “I’m	  a	  linguist”;	  “I’m	  a	  philosopher	  of	  language”;	  “I’m	  a	  scholar	  in	  communication	  studies”.	  These	  replies,	  relieving	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  will	  nevertheless	  sharpen	  the	  pain	  of	  semioticians,	  as	  they	  realize	  how	  easy	  their	  life	  would	  be	  if	  they	  really	  were	  linguists,	  or	  philosophers,	  or	  communication	  theorists.	  At	  every	  new	  lie,	  as	  semioticians	  see	  a	  bright	  expression	  of	  recognition	  appearing	  on	  their	  interlocutor’s	  face,	  their	  feeling	  of	  identity	  will	  further	  disintegrate,	  leaving	  them	  with	  an	  excruciating	  question:	  “Who	  am	  I?	  Am	  I	  living	  a	  lie?”.	  The	  reason	  I	  decided	  to	  write	  this	  essay,	  however,	  is	  not	  offer	  counseling	  and	  consoling	  thoughts	  to	  lost	  semioticians.	  Conversely,	  here	  I	  want	  to	  take	  these	  party	  conversations	  seriously.	  I	  want	  to	  ponder	  over	  those	  puzzled	  looks,	  bored	  faces,	  contemptuous	  comments,	  useless	  explanations,	  self-­‐diminishing	  lies,	  and	  analyze	  them.	  Most	  of	  all,	  I	  want	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  traditional	  object	  of	  semiotics,	  which	  gives	  the	  discipline	  its	  name:	  the	  sign.	  Why	  did	  semiotics	  develop	  as	  a	  discipline	  that	  concentrates	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  sign,	  and	  that	  sees	  and	  interprets	  the	  world	  through	  this	  concept?	  Why	  was	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  science	  that	  systematically	  studies	  signs	  welcome	  in	  a	  certain	  epoch	  of	  humanity,	  and	  why	  does	  it	  seem	  so	  abstruse	  to	  most	  nowadays?	  Should	  it	  be	  given	  up,	  like	  something	  that	  belongs	  to	  a	  remote,	  vanished	  past?	  Or	  is	  there	  something	  in	  semiotics	  that	  still	  offers	  answers	  that	  no	  other	  discipline	  can	  provide?	  This	  essay,	  however,	  is	  not	  about	  marketing	  semiotics.	  It	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  making	  propaganda	  for	  the	  discipline	  and	  the	  usefulness	  of	  its	  academic	  and	  social	  existence.	  It	  is	  not	  excluded,	  indeed,	  that	  this	  inquiry	  will	  come	  up	  with	  a	  bitter,	  disheartening	  conclusion:	  that	  semiotics	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really	  is	  something	  past,	  local,	  and	  locked	  in	  an	  ivory	  tower,	  doomed	  to	  the	  same	  destiny	  of	  medieval	  scholastic	  or	  early	  modern	  casuistry.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  this	  exercise	  of	  self-­‐analysis	  will	  end	  up	  with	  a	  different	  conclusion,	  showing	  unexplored	  potential	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  sign,	  the	  discipline	  of	  semiotics,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  semioticians.	  Social	  recognition	  is	  not	  always	  evidence	  of	  theoretical	  or	  analytical	  status.	  Some	  scientific	  or	  medical	  disciplines	  bear	  names	  that	  are	  unknown	  to	  the	  general	  public	  but	  are	  nevertheless	  central.	  Most	  educated	  people	  won’t	  precisely	  know	  what	  a	  nephrologist	  does,	  and	  a	  person	  introducing	  him-­‐or	  herself	  as	  nephrologist	  at	  a	  party	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  elicit	  the	  same	  bewildered	  faces	  semioticians	  are	  confronted	  with.	  However,	  people	  who	  have	  serious	  kidney	  problems	  will	  soon	  learn	  what	  a	  nephrologist	  is	  about.	  But	  that	  is	  exactly	  the	  point.	  Although	  the	  name	  of	  the	  profession	  is	  mysterious,	  deriving	  from	  a	  Greek	  word	  like	  semiotics	  does,	  its	  object	  is	  clear.	  The	  nephrologist	  indeed	  might	  also	  introduce	  him-­‐or	  herself,	  more	  clearly,	  as	  “kidney	  doctor”;	  but	  can	  semioticians	  introduce	  themselves	  as	  “sign	  doctors”?	  Unfortunately,	  signs	  are	  objects	  whose	  quality	  consistently	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  kidneys.	  What	  kind	  of	  an	  object	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  sign,	  and	  why	  was	  an	  entire	  academic	  discipline	  shaped	  around	  it?	  Is	  the	  project	  still	  sustainable?	  	  	  	  
2.	  The	  anthropological	  genesis	  of	  semiotics.	  	  As	  historians	  of	  semiotics	  have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  concept	  of	  sign	  is	  very	  oldi.	  Both	  in	  the	  west	  and	  in	  the	  east,	  when	  people	  started	  to	  philosophize,	  they	  often	  came	  up	  with	  modes	  of	  thinking	  that	  were	  similar	  to	  the	  contemporary	  concept	  of	  sign,	  that	  which	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  modern	  semiotics	  (Eschbach	  and	  Trabant	  1983).	  Various	  definitions	  of	  sign	  have	  been	  given,	  culminating	  in	  the	  classic	  articulations	  that	  Saussure	  and	  Peirce	  offered	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (Saussure	  1972;	  Peirce	  1931-­‐5).	  The	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  reflect	  whether	  these	  definitions	  are	  still	  valid,	  retrieve	  some	  forgotten	  definitions	  from	  past	  history	  —	  or	  proto-­‐history	  —	  of	  semiotics,	  or	  propose	  some	  new	  ones,	  but	  consider	  whether	  the	  kind	  of	  human	  experience	  that	  prompted	  the	  philosophical	  creation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  sign,	  and	  make	  it	  central	  in	  certain	  contexts,	  is	  still	  relevant.	  Two	  domains,	  in	  western	  antiquity,	  played	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  sign:	  divination	  and	  medicine	  (Manetti	  1996;	  King	  1982).	  In	  both	  domains,	  professionals	  (haruspices	  in	  ancient	  Rome,	  doctors)	  sought	  to	  provide	  techniques	  in	  order	  to	  somehow	  control,	  or	  at	  least	  become	  acquainted	  with,	  the	  invisible	  forces	  that	  influence	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humans.	  Haruspices	  were	  consulted	  so	  as	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  certain	  activity	  was	  undertaken	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  bad	  or	  good	  omen	  (Beerden	  2013;	  Raphals	  2013;	  Rosenberger	  2013).	  Doctors	  were	  consulted	  so	  as	  to	  establish	  whether	  malign	  forces	  were	  weakening	  or	  even	  destroying	  the	  body	  (Holmes	  2010;	  Nutton	  2013;	  Ferngren	  2014).	  In	  both	  contexts,	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  was	  later	  known	  as	  “sign”,	  was	  a	  response	  to	  incertitude	  and	  invisibility.	  Unseen,	  often	  malevolent	  forces	  were	  thought	  to	  condition	  human	  destiny.	  Knowing	  them	  and	  understanding	  their	  will	  directly	  was,	  nevertheless,	  impossible.	  These	  forces,	  it	  was	  believed,	  spoke	  to	  humanity	  not	  through	  clear	  words,	  but	  through	  voices	  that	  had	  to	  be	  recognized,	  studied,	  and	  interpreted.	  In	  divination,	  professionals	  had	  first	  to	  identify	  the	  perceptual	  space	  in	  which	  these	  voices	  would	  emerge.	  The	  internal	  organs	  of	  animals	  or	  the	  sky	  would,	  therefore,	  play	  the	  same	  role;	  they	  would	  be	  turned	  into	  the	  limited	  field	  within	  which	  visible	  voices	  of	  invisible	  forces	  could	  manifest	  themselves	  and,	  if	  appropriately	  interpreted,	  speak	  (Ginzburg	  1986;	  Christin	  1995;	  Manetti	  1998).	  They	  also	  shared	  another	  essential	  characteristic:	  they	  both	  included	  random,	  unexpected	  irregularities.	  The	  capricious	  conformation	  of	  organs	  or	  the	  equally	  irregular	  flying	  of	  birds	  across	  the	  sky	  were	  instrumental	  in	  turning	  the	  field	  of	  observation	  into	  a	  field	  of	  divination	  (Volli	  1988;	  Leone	  2014:	  515-­‐28;	  Wiley	  2015).	  From	  the	  contemporary	  perspective,	  indeed,	  the	  effort	  of	  the	  haruspex	  consisted	  in	  turning	  what	  was	  apparently	  irregular	  and	  meaningless	  into	  a	  message	  (Lambert	  and	  Guilhem	  2012).	  In	  other	  words,	  divination	  was	  a	  translation,	  rendering	  the	  mysterious	  and	  chaotic	  voices	  of	  invisible	  forces	  into	  regular,	  and	  understandable,	  words.	  Like	  every	  translation,	  divination	  therefore	  needed	  a	  code,	  a	  system	  of	  matching	  able	  to	  attribute	  a	  specific	  meaning	  to	  each	  excrescence	  in	  an	  animal’s	  organ,	  to	  each	  sudden	  appearance	  of	  birds	  in	  the	  sky	  (Dusi	  and	  Neergard	  2000;	  Marsciani	  2007).	  Of	  course,	  such	  code	  could	  only	  be	  partially	  formalized	  by	  tradition,	  and	  vaguely	  transmitted	  from	  generation	  to	  generation	  of	  fortune-­‐tellers.	  However,	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  behind	  divination,	  associating	  invisible	  forces	  with	  chaotic	  perceptions,	  and	  translating	  these	  into	  understandable	  verbal	  messages,	  was	  fundamental	  in	  those	  societies.	  Being	  able	  to	  read	  the	  mercurial	  will	  of	  those	  forces	  was	  of	  primary	  importance	  for	  those	  who	  wanted	  to	  maintain	  control	  on	  their	  lives	  (Fabbrichesi	  2006).	  Ancient	  medicine	  also	  worked	  according	  to	  similar	  principles,	  although	  in	  this	  case	  the	  field	  to	  be	  observed	  in	  search	  of	  voices	  from	  a	  mysterious	  elsewhere	  had	  not	  to	  be	  created	  but	  coincided	  with	  the	  body.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  part	  of	  medicine	  that	  was	  later	  known	  as	  semeiotics	  —	  the	  ancestor	  of	  modern	  semiotics	  —	  also	  had	  to	  segment	  the	  body	  in	  order	  to	  
	   5	  
identify	  some	  specific	  fields	  of	  observation,	  for	  instance	  the	  skin	  with	  its	  irregular	  colors,	  textures,	  and	  shapes,	  or	  the	  equally	  capricious	  fluids	  produced	  by	  the	  human	  body	  (Viola	  1928;	  Sahli	  1928-­‐32).	  These	  could	  be	  observed	  and	  translated	  into	  a	  diagnosis,	  that	  is,	  a	  verbal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  hidden	  forces	  moving	  in	  the	  body	  and	  manifesting	  themselves	  through	  mysterious	  appearances	  (Giustetto,	  Nejrotti,	  and	  Novara	  1997).	  Medicine	  came	  to	  be	  more	  codified	  than	  divination,	  and	  developed	  into	  both	  a	  practice	  and	  a	  science	  for	  it	  could	  rely	  on	  procedures	  of	  falsification.	  There	  was,	  of	  course,	  no	  causal	  relation	  between	  a	  certain	  flight	  of	  birds	  in	  the	  sky	  and	  the	  success	  of	  a	  military	  campaign:	  the	  mysterious	  forces	  that	  were	  thought	  to	  connect	  them	  disappeared	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  Christianity,	  replaced	  by	  other	  mysterious	  forces	  (Ferngren	  2009).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  there	  was	  a	  physical,	  causal	  connection	  between	  the	  appearance	  of	  stains	  on	  the	  skin	  of	  a	  patient	  and	  a	  disease	  (Leone	  Forthcoming	  Help).	  Doctors	  who	  could	  correctly	  identify	  the	  connection,	  and	  prescribe	  the	  appropriate	  therapy,	  had	  their	  patients	  survive,	  while	  less	  fortunate	  patients,	  with	  less	  perspicacious	  doctors,	  would	  die.	  Therefore,	  human	  bodies,	  their	  survival	  and	  death,	  became	  the	  field	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  diagnoses	  could	  be	  tested	  and	  dramatically	  falsified	  or	  corroborated.	  To	  resume,	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  became	  foundational	  for	  modern	  semiotics	  developed	  mostly	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  ancient	  divination	  and	  medicine.	  They	  both	  consisted	  in	  traditions,	  strategies,	  methods,	  and	  techniques	  to	  probe,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  control,	  the	  invisible	  forces	  conditioning	  human	  lives.	  Directly	  knowing	  what	  these	  forces	  wanted	  or	  were	  meant	  to	  was	  precluded	  to	  laymen,	  who	  had	  to	  resort	  to	  specialists	  in	  order	  to	  single	  out	  and	  interpret	  those	  voices.	  Therefore,	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  at	  work	  in	  both	  divination	  and	  ancient	  medicine	  implied:	  1)	  an	  invisible	  agency;	  2)	  acting	  according	  to	  mysterious	  plans;	  3)	  affecting	  human	  lives,	  either	  as	  individuals	  or	  in	  community;	  4)	  manifesting	  itself	  through	  perceptible	  but	  capricious	  elements	  of	  reality;	  5)	  requiring	  the	  mediation	  of	  professionals	  (haruspices,	  doctors)	  in	  order	  to	  6)	  single	  out	  those	  elements	  in	  a	  field;	  7)	  identify	  patterns	  in	  their	  apparent	  irregularity;	  8)	  associate	  these	  patterns	  with	  verbal	  interpretations;	  9)	  pronounce	  a	  response	  on	  the	  probable	  course	  of	  actions	  these	  invisible	  forces	  would	  take,	  and	  10)	  propose	  some	  remedies,	  such	  as	  sacrifices	  to	  the	  gods	  or	  medical	  treatments,	  in	  order	  to	  divert	  or	  influence	  this	  course	  if	  deemed	  negative.	  A	  corollary	  of	  this	  development	  is	  that	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  anticipated	  modern	  semiotics	  somehow	  already	  showed	  a	  bifurcation	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  logics.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  divination	  could	  only	  arbitrarily	  associate	  the	  will	  of	  gods	  with	  the	  flying	  of	  birds	  in	  the	  sky,	  or	  with	  the	  shape	  of	  animals’	  internal	  organs.	  At	  that	  time	  it	  was	  believed	  that	  
	   6	  
a	  causal,	  and	  not	  an	  arbitrary	  association,	  connected	  the	  two	  dimensions,	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  invisible,	  the	  mysterious	  and	  the	  interpretive,	  the	  non-­‐verbal	  and	  the	  verbal	  (Busine	  2005;	  Johnston	  and	  Struck	  2005;	  Flower	  2008).	  Later	  on,	  though,	  lack	  of	  evidence	  and	  falsification	  revealed	  divinatory	  techniques	  for	  what	  they	  were:	  arbitrary,	  traditional	  modes	  of	  ascribing	  meaning	  to	  meaningless	  objects.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  medical	  knowledge	  of	  symptoms	  fully	  developed	  into	  science,	  in	  which	  arbitrary	  interpretations	  were	  discarded,	  traditions	  tested,	  falsification	  garnered	  through	  feed-­‐back	  of	  the	  human	  body,	  and	  semeiotics	  established	  as	  a	  discipline	  that	  only	  deals	  with	  causal	  meaningfulness,	  with	  those	  elements	  of	  perception	  that	  modern	  Peircean	  semiotics	  would	  have	  called	  “indexes”.	  The	  picture	  of	  the	  conceptual	  genesis	  of	  semiotics	  would	  be	  incomplete	  without	  considering	  that	  similar	  modes	  of	  thinking	  were	  explicitly	  at	  work	  also	  in	  other	  domains	  of	  life.	  Divination	  and	  medicine	  were	  both	  about	  the	  identification,	  and	  consequent	  interpretation,	  of	  spontaneous	  elements	  of	  reality.	  Haruspices	  could	  operate	  so	  that	  such	  elements	  would	  manifest	  themselves	  more	  clearly,	  for	  instance	  exposing	  the	  internal	  organs	  of	  an	  animal;	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  doctors	  could	  encourage	  the	  production	  of	  semeiotic	  evidence	  by	  forcing	  patients	  to	  conserve	  their	  body	  excretions	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  medical	  examination.	  However,	  in	  both	  cases,	  it	  was	  the	  agency	  of	  mysterious	  forces	  to	  produce	  evidence	  of	  their	  future	  course	  of	  action	  in	  nature,	  either	  in	  the	  sky	  or	  in	  the	  human	  body.	  Nevertheless,	  ancient	  civilizations	  were	  also	  familiar	  with	  other	  processes,	  whose	  effect	  was	  that	  of	  creating	  human-­‐made	  artifacts	  that	  would	  then	  exert	  their	  own	  agency	  (Gell	  1998).	  That	  is	  what	  the	  ancient	  practice	  of	  the	  portrait	  was	  about.	  Western	  myths	  about	  the	  ‘invention	  of	  painting’	  relate	  that	  the	  first	  icon	  was	  created	  as	  future	  pictorial	  replacement	  of	  an	  absent	  lover.ii	  That	  too	  was	  a	  ‘mode	  of	  thinking’,	  or	  better,	  an	  ‘operational	  mode’	  that	  would	  then	  become	  part	  of	  semiotics:	  given	  an	  object,	  a	  simulacrum	  is	  created	  that	  allows	  that	  object	  to	  be	  somehow	  present	  to	  the	  mind	  although	  it	  is	  not	  present	  to	  perception	  any	  longer.	  For	  a	  simulacrum	  to	  work,	  then,	  it	  must	  possess	  qualities	  that	  enable	  a	  sort	  of	  bifurcation	  in	  perception.	  The	  lover	  sees	  the	  portrait,	  appreciates	  its	  configuration	  of	  shapes	  and	  colors,	  but	  then	  this	  configuration	  triggers	  recognition,	  that	  is,	  mental	  reference	  to	  the	  absent	  object	  of	  desire.	  Indeed,	  the	  configuration	  is	  such	  that	  its	  internal	  proportions	  and	  relations	  reproduce,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  the	  internal	  proportions	  and	  relations	  of	  the	  ‘real’	  beloved	  (Marin	  1983;	  Marin	  1993).	  	  	  
3.	  The	  refinement	  of	  ancient	  semiotics.	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  In	  divination	  as	  well	  as	  in	  medicine,	  apparently	  capricious	  configurations	  of	  reality	  were	  ‘read’	  as	  messages	  from	  mysterious	  forces	  (according	  to	  a	  symbolical	  logic	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  to	  an	  indexical,	  causal	  logic	  in	  the	  second).	  In	  the	  arts,	  humans	  replaced	  gods	  (or	  ‘nature’)	  in	  shaping	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  beloved	  but	  absent	  object	  and	  its	  present	  simulacrum.	  In	  the	  three	  cases,	  however,	  a	  semiotic	  competence	  was	  indispensable	  in	  order	  to	  bridge	  the	  mental	  gap	  between	  two	  dimensions:	  presence	  and	  absence,	  visibility	  and	  invisibility,	  perception	  and	  silence.	  Without	  this	  competence,	  humans	  would	  be	  left	  awestruck,	  terrified	  by	  the	  uncontrollable	  agencies	  shaping	  their	  future,	  affecting	  their	  bodies,	  separating	  them	  from	  their	  cherished	  objects.	  As	  professional	  skills	  were	  developed	  in	  the	  first	  two	  realms	  in	  order	  to	  help	  other	  humans	  to	  bridge	  this	  gap	  (haruspices,	  doctors),	  so	  in	  the	  third	  realm	  too,	  artists	  acquired	  special	  abilities	  for	  the	  evocation	  of	  absent	  objects	  through	  their	  simulacra.	  The	  doctor,	  the	  haruspex,	  and	  the	  painter	  were	  the	  first	  semiotic	  champions	  of	  humanity.	  They	  were,	  indeed,	  skillful	  manipulators	  of	  what	  Peircean	  semiotics	  would	  later	  call	  indexes,	  symbols,	  and	  icons.	  Doctors	  would	  learn	  or	  develop	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  techniques	  so	  as	  to	  infer	  from	  apparently	  random	  oddities	  in	  the	  human	  body	  the	  specific	  force,	  that	  is,	  the	  disease,	  probably	  causing	  it.	  Their	  knowledge	  was	  transmitted	  from	  generation	  to	  generation	  of	  doctors,	  through	  apprenticeship	  but	  also	  through	  books;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  was	  open	  to	  falsification	  and	  innovation	  by	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  by	  experiment.	  Haruspices	  could	  not	  falsify	  previous	  methods	  of	  divination	  because	  they	  were	  not	  falsifiable.	  Methods	  of	  connecting	  omens	  with	  predictions	  were	  absorbed	  from	  tradition	  and	  handed	  down	  to	  posterity	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  improving	  them	  in	  any	  way.	  New	  divination	  techniques	  were	  periodically	  introduced,	  but	  they	  would	  not	  better	  the	  previous	  ones	  for	  they	  would	  also	  be	  based	  on	  the	  same	  symbolical	  logic,	  associating	  strange	  marks	  in	  an	  animal’s	  internal	  organs	  and	  insights	  about	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  battle	  without	  any	  causal	  cogency.	  	  Finally,	  artists	  too	  could	  not	  improve	  their	  pictorial	  techniques	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  doctors	  better	  their	  diagnostic	  capacities.	  Ancient	  art	  knew	  some	  form	  of	  indexical	  creation,	  for	  instance	  death	  masks.	  Molded	  directly	  on	  the	  face	  of	  the	  defunct,	  a	  funerary	  mask	  was	  created	  not	  only	  according	  to	  an	  iconic	  logic	  of	  resemblance,	  but	  also	  according	  to	  an	  indexical	  logic	  of	  causality	  (Zadoks	  and	  Jitta	  1932:	  90-­‐5;	  Pohl	  1938;	  Schuyler	  1986;	  Schlosser	  1993).	  The	  shape	  of	  the	  face,	  with	  its	  specific	  features,	  would	  cause	  the	  wax	  to	  be	  molded	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  However,	  that	  was	  an	  exception,	  and	  in	  pictorial	  representation	  either	  there	  was	  no	  objective	  method	  to	  falsify	  a	  ‘bad’	  simulacrum.	  A	  simulacrum	  was	  to	  be	  discarded	  if	  it	  didn’t	  trigger	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recognition	  of	  the	  original	  and	  therefore	  mental	  reference	  to	  it,	  for	  instance	  when	  a	  portrait	  was	  considered	  as	  failed	  because	  it	  didn’t	  resemble	  a	  face.	  And	  yet,	  rejection	  in	  this	  case	  would	  not	  be	  objective	  but	  subjective.	  Reality	  exerts	  pressure	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  icons	  more	  than	  on	  the	  manipulation	  of	  symbols	  but	  less	  than	  on	  the	  determination	  of	  indexes.	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  room	  for	  improvement	  also	  in	  the	  arts,	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  be	  hardly	  codified	  and	  transmitted	  from	  generation	  to	  generation.	  A	  doctor	  could	  come	  up	  with	  a	  new	  diagnostic	  technique	  and	  codify	  it	  in	  teaching,	  either	  in	  person	  or	  through	  books.	  A	  painter	  or	  a	  sculptor	  could	  also	  come	  up	  with	  a	  better	  technique	  for	  the	  production	  of	  resembling	  simulacra,	  and	  yet	  this	  technique	  could	  not	  be	  codified	  and	  handed	  down	  to	  subsequent	  artists	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  doctor	  would	  pass	  his	  knowledge	  to	  future	  physicians.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  divergence	  lies	  exactly	  in	  the	  different	  logic	  the	  two	  domains	  would	  follow:	  the	  doctor	  would	  search	  for	  plausible	  causes	  behind	  abnormal	  manifestations	  of	  the	  body;	  the	  artist	  would	  arrange	  shapes	  and	  colors	  so	  that	  they	  might	  look	  like	  the	  result	  of	  a	  previous	  perception	  of	  the	  original.	  Doctors	  were	  looking	  for	  causes,	  artists	  for	  effects,	  that	  is	  why	  the	  former’s	  procedures	  could	  be	  objective	  and	  codified,	  whereas	  the	  latter’s	  skills	  intrinsically	  remained	  subjective	  and,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  impossible	  to	  codify.	  The	  history	  of	  western	  art	  offers	  a	  rich	  literature	  of	  guidance	  for	  artists	  (Schlosser	  1924;	  Barocchi	  1960-­‐2);	  moreover,	  artistic	  apprenticeship	  was	  progressively	  institutionalized	  through	  academies	  and	  schools.	  Nevertheless,	  working	  by	  a	  famous	  artist’s	  side	  in	  his	  workshop	  would	  always	  stay	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  an	  artist’s	  training,	  and	  the	  success	  of	  pictorial	  creation	  largely	  remain	  inexplicable,	  or	  be	  explained	  through	  vague	  ideas	  like	  ‘talent’	  or	  ‘genius’	  (Bloom	  2002).	  In	  antiquity,	  the	  doctors	  who	  first	  would	  understand	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  symptom	  and	  its	  causes,	  and	  invent	  a	  new	  cure,	  were	  also	  revered	  as	  geniuses	  by	  their	  contemporaries	  (Nutton	  2013).	  Yet,	  their	  creation	  was	  not	  mysterious.	  Once	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  disease	  had	  been	  found,	  subsequent	  doctors	  could	  apply	  the	  same	  rule	  to	  infer	  the	  same	  disease	  from	  the	  same	  symptoms,	  and	  prescribe	  the	  same	  therapy	  to	  cure	  it.	  That	  could	  not	  be	  said	  of	  an	  artist;	  certain	  techniques	  for	  the	  production	  of	  resembling	  simulacra,	  like	  Renaissance	  perspective,	  for	  instance,	  could	  be	  codified	  and	  handed	  down	  to	  subsequent	  artists	  (Poudra	  1864;	  Panofsky	  1924-­‐5;	  Kemp	  1990).	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  skills	  enabling	  a	  painter	  to	  evoke,	  through	  simulacra,	  the	  body	  of	  an	  absent	  lover,	  or	  of	  an	  absent	  god,	  escaped	  formalization	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  transmission.	  In	  a	  way,	  each	  generation	  of	  artists	  must	  reinvent	  ex-­‐novo	  the	  means	  through	  which	  artistic	  representations	  can	  be	  offered	  as	  the	  effect	  of	  an	  absent	  cause,	  because	  each	  generation	  of	  artists	  must	  face	  a	  continuously	  evolving	  audience	  and	  sense	  of	  resemblance	  (Baudrillard	  1981;	  Payot	  1997;	  Noudelmann	  2012).	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Contemporary	  medicine	  is	  incredibly	  more	  sophisticated	  than	  ancient	  medicine.	  Yet,	  a	  diagnosis	  that	  was	  effective	  in	  the	  5th	  Century	  B.C.E.	  would	  be	  effective	  nowadays	  too.	  The	  human	  body	  indeed	  evolves	  in	  time,	  following	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  species	  and	  yielding	  to	  the	  pressure	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  conditions,	  but	  not	  with	  such	  a	  rapidity	  as	  to	  provoke	  the	  continuous	  obsolescence	  of	  medical	  knowledge.	  A	  doctor	  from	  the	  1960s	  could	  easily	  take	  care	  of	  a	  patient	  of	  today,	  since	  therapies	  that	  proved	  effective	  in	  the	  past	  remain	  effective	  in	  the	  present	  and	  will	  keep	  effective	  in	  the	  future,	  if	  the	  human	  body	  does	  not	  change	  in	  the	  meantime.	  Future	  diagnostic	  or	  therapeutic	  techniques	  could	  prove	  more	  efficient,	  but	  old	  techniques	  will	  not	  cease	  to	  be	  effective	  as	  a	  consequence.	  Conversely,	  the	  domain	  of	  resemblance	  evolves	  in	  relation	  to	  culture,	  not	  nature.	  The	  faster	  culture	  changes	  the	  quicker	  codes	  and	  laws	  of	  resemblance	  become	  obsolete	  (Calabrese	  1985).	  A	  medieval	  portrait	  looks	  extremely	  primitive	  to	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  who	  are	  familiar	  with	  photography	  and	  even	  the	  invention	  of	  photography	  did	  not	  stop	  the	  obsolescence	  of	  iconic	  techniques,	  on	  the	  contrary.	  The	  photograph	  of	  a	  face	  taken	  in	  the	  1960s	  seems	  incredibly	  opaque	  nowadays,	  because	  codes	  of	  iconic	  production	  and	  resemblance	  have	  changed	  in	  the	  meantime,	  leading	  to	  flat	  screens,	  3-­‐D,	  retina	  definition,	  etc.	  Indeed,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  simulacra	  are	  related	  to	  their	  originals	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  a	  causal	  logic	  but	  to	  an	  iconic	  one,	  which	  is	  largely	  influenced	  by	  subjective	  considerations	  and	  even	  more	  by	  cultural	  fashions	  (Mosquera	  2011).	  Great	  artists	  who	  are	  revered	  across	  the	  epochs,	  then,	  are	  those	  who	  are	  deemed	  to	  have	  grasped	  some	  universal	  laws	  of	  representation,	  thus	  creating	  icons	  that	  defy	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  perceptual	  customs.	  However,	  no	  artist	  is	  immune	  from	  the	  danger	  of	  obsolescence	  (Lotman	  2009).	  	  	  
4.	  Time	  and	  language	  in	  semiotic	  modes.	  	  More	  generally,	  the	  logics	  according	  to	  which	  doctors,	  artists,	  and	  haruspices	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  known	  and	  unknown,	  visible	  and	  invisible,	  perceptible	  and	  imperceptible,	  present	  and	  absent,	  differ	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  respond	  to	  time	  and	  language.	  Haruspices	  can	  verbally	  describe	  the	  ‘technique’	  through	  which	  they	  associate	  omens	  and	  predictions.	  Yet,	  they	  cannot	  explain	  in	  words	  why	  they	  do	  so.	  They	  can	  only	  refer	  to	  tradition,	  for	  instance	  to	  rituals	  handed	  down	  to	  them	  by	  previous	  haruspices.	  Nature	  does	  not	  exert	  any	  pressure	  on	  haruspices,	  since	  their	  modes	  of	  thinking	  cannot	  be	  falsified.	  However,	  what	  makes	  pressure	  on	  them	  is	  doxa,	  that	  is,	  beliefs	  shared	  by	  community	  (Lotman	  2001).	  The	  less	  people	  believe	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in	  the	  connection	  haruspices	  make	  between	  omens	  and	  predictions,	  the	  less	  their	  work	  will	  be	  valued,	  remunerated,	  and	  even	  tolerated.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  Christianity,	  and	  the	  affirmation	  of	  a	  new	  model	  explaining	  the	  transcendent	  forces	  acting	  in	  human	  life,	  haruspices	  were	  simply	  swept	  away,	  and	  their	  ‘knowledge’	  survived	  only	  by	  transmogrifying	  into	  aspects	  of	  the	  new	  system	  of	  beliefs	  (Jones	  2014).	  The	  knowledge	  of	  doctors	  also	  is,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  culture.	  Definitions	  of	  ‘good	  health’,	  ‘pain’,	  and	  even	  ‘death’	  have	  changed	  throughout	  history	  with	  the	  rapidity	  of	  culture	  (Ariès	  1977;	  Horstmanshoff,	  King,	  and	  Zittel	  2012;	  Corbellini	  2014).	  Yet,	  definitions	  of	  death	  have	  not	  changed	  so	  much	  as	  to	  completely	  revolutionize	  the	  human	  understanding	  of	  medicine.	  Present-­‐day	  medical	  students	  still	  take	  the	  Hippocratic	  oath,	  and	  acknowledge	  that	  their	  success	  will	  rely	  on	  their	  scientific	  knowledge,	  not	  on	  faithfulness	  to	  tradition	  (Fantini	  and	  Lambrichs	  2014).	  They	  learn	  through	  long	  training	  which	  techniques	  have	  proven	  efficacious	  in	  bettering	  and	  prolonging	  human	  life.	  If	  they	  are	  talented	  and	  lucky,	  they	  themselves	  will	  come	  up	  with	  new	  knowledge	  and	  methods	  to	  better	  dispel	  death	  from	  the	  existential	  horizon	  of	  patients.	  Differently	  from	  divination	  techniques,	  medical	  knowledge	  evolves	  independently	  from	  systems	  of	  beliefs	  and	  human	  cognitions	  (Sicard	  and	  Vigarello	  2011;	  Rongières	  2013).	  Penicillin	  is	  efficacious	  against	  bacteria	  even	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  does	  not	  believe	  so,	  and	  what	  compels	  its	  medical	  usage	  is	  not	  doxa	  but	  evidence:	  people	  treated	  with	  penicillin	  survive,	  others	  die.	  The	  causal	  nature	  of	  medical	  knowledge	  allows	  medical	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  verbally	  formulated,	  transmitted	  to	  future	  generations	  of	  physicians,	  tested,	  and	  falsified	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  more	  effective	  knowledge	  (Smith,	  Meyers,	  and	  Cook	  2014).	  That	  is	  why	  present-­‐day	  doctors	  can	  be	  extremely	  certain	  that	  their	  knowledge,	  methods,	  and	  techniques	  are	  better	  than	  those	  of	  their	  medieval	  predecessors.	  Contemporary	  artists	  cannot	  hold	  the	  same	  certainty.	  The	  efficacy	  by	  which	  they	  create	  simulacra	  is	  totally	  disconnected	  from	  nature	  and	  entirely	  depends	  on	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  cultural	  modes.	  A	  20th-­‐century	  cubist	  painting	  would	  have	  been	  pure	  visual	  noise	  to	  a	  Renaissance	  observer,	  and	  yet	  to	  a	  21st-­‐century	  observer	  it	  evokes	  cognitions	  and	  emotions	  more	  effectively	  than	  Renaissance	  painting	  could	  ever	  do	  (Leone	  2012	  On	  Aniconicity).	  Present-­‐day	  museum	  visitors	  still	  cherish	  Leonardo,	  and	  acknowledge	  that	  his	  simulacra	  are	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  passing	  of	  time.	  Yet,	  they	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  Guernica	  strike	  them	  more	  than	  the	  Battle	  of	  Anghiari,	  the	  former	  being	  more	  able	  than	  the	  latter	  to	  represent	  the	  horrors	  of	  aerial	  bombing	  and	  technological	  warfare.	  Like	  the	  predictions	  of	  haruspices,	  the	  simulacra	  of	  artists	  cannot	  be	  falsified,	  since	  they	  connect	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  invisible,	  the	  present	  and	  the	  absence	  in	  a	  way	  entirely	  depending	  on	  laws	  of	  resemblance	  that	  do	  not	  lie	  in	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nature	  but	  in	  culture	  (Gombrich	  1960).	  Recognition	  indeed	  stems	  from	  matching	  between	  an	  artist’s	  representational	  skills	  and	  the	  cultural	  assumptions	  of	  the	  observer,	  but	  such	  matching	  follows	  schemes	  that	  can	  neither	  verbally	  codified	  nor	  tested	  against	  evidence.	  The	  success	  of	  an	  icon	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  connect,	  or	  even	  to	  anticipate,	  the	  cultural	  sensibility	  of	  an	  audience,	  and	  yet	  since	  this	  continuously	  changes,	  icons	  inevitably	  lose	  and	  acquire	  efficaciousness	  depending	  on	  the	  fluctuations	  of	  cultural	  modes	  and	  fashions	  (Calabrese	  1987).	  After	  such	  meandering	  reasoning	  a	  recapitulation	  is	  in	  order.	  The	  essay	  has	  identified	  three	  domains	  of	  activities	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  western	  semiotic	  sensibility:	  divination,	  medicine,	  and	  the	  fine	  arts.	  In	  all	  three	  domains,	  the	  gap	  between	  unknown	  and	  known,	  invisible	  and	  visible,	  absent	  and	  present,	  is	  bridged	  through	  specific	  skills	  and	  operations,	  whose	  complexity	  requires	  the	  establishment	  of	  professional	  figures:	  the	  haruspex,	  the	  doctor,	  and	  the	  artist.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  three	  figures	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  ontologically	  distinguished	  dimensions	  is,	  nevertheless,	  different.	  Haruspices	  rely	  on	  tradition.	  Their	  ritual	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  falsified.	  Its	  motivations	  can	  neither	  be	  verbalized	  nor	  transmitted	  through	  learning.	  It	  cannot	  be	  improved	  according	  to	  evolutionary	  schemes	  and	  its	  efficacy	  entirely	  depends	  on	  consensus.	  As	  systems	  of	  belief	  change,	  haruspices’	  divinations	  are	  abandoned,	  their	  way	  of	  associating	  visible	  and	  invisible	  discarded	  or	  transformed	  into	  new	  beliefs.	  Doctors	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  tradition	  but	  on	  science.	  Their	  scientific	  knowledge	  can	  be	  falsified.	  Its	  motivations	  are	  causal,	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  put	  into	  words	  and	  codified	  into	  systematic	  learning.	  Medical	  knowledge,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  improves	  according	  to	  evolutionary	  lines,	  its	  efficacy	  depending	  not	  on	  consensus	  but	  on	  patients’	  survival.	  That	  is	  why	  medical	  diagnostic	  and	  therapeutic	  techniques	  do	  not	  change	  along	  with	  cultural	  systems	  of	  beliefs	  but,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  improve	  as	  knowledge	  of	  the	  human	  body	  improves.	  Artists	  rely	  neither	  on	  tradition	  nor	  on	  science.	  There	  is	  tradition	  in	  the	  arts,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  vouch	  for	  the	  efficacy	  of	  simulacra.	  Iconicity	  is	  what	  grounds	  an	  artist’s	  ability	  to	  evoke	  absent	  objects,	  emotions,	  or	  cognitions,	  but	  the	  laws	  of	  iconicity	  are	  cultural,	  not	  natural,	  and	  do	  not	  change	  according	  to	  evolutionary	  schemes.	  They	  cannot	  be	  falsified	  or	  codified.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  success	  of	  artists	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  haruspices,	  meaning	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  agreement	  they	  manage	  to	  elicit	  in	  an	  audience.	  However,	  the	  ontological	  direction	  along	  which	  such	  consensus	  is	  sought	  for	  is	  different.	  Haruspices	  rely	  on	  tradition	  in	  order	  to	  show	  what	  mysterious	  causes	  affect	  the	  world;	  artists	  rely	  on	  invention	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  the	  effects	  that	  those	  absent	  causes	  are	  expected	  to	  produce.	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The	  following	  sections	  will	  look	  for	  the	  echoes	  of	  these	  three	  modes	  of	  thinking	  in	  present-­‐day	  society.	  	  	  
5.	  Haruspices.	  	  Who	  are	  the	  haruspices	  of	  today?	  What	  professional	  figures	  operate	  with	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  was	  characteristic	  of	  ancient	  divination?	  Despite	  the	  phenomenal	  progress	  of	  science	  in	  explaining	  the	  laws	  that	  rule	  nature	  and,	  to	  a	  minor	  extent,	  culture,	  humans	  still	  live	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  their	  lives	  are	  partially	  controlled	  by	  unknown	  forces.	  The	  contemporary	  human	  being	  is	  not	  as	  dominated	  by	  fear	  of	  these	  forces	  as	  the	  prehistoric,	  or	  the	  medieval	  human	  were,	  and	  has	  developed	  cognitive,	  emotional,	  and	  pragmatic	  strategies	  to	  cope	  with	  uncertainty.	  Whenever	  possible,	  scientific	  research	  is	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  explain,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  divert,	  the	  evil	  forces	  that	  loom	  large	  in	  the	  life	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  a	  community.	  Yet,	  for	  a	  vast	  part	  of	  humanity,	  resort	  to	  science	  and	  technology	  so	  as	  to	  foresee	  and	  prevent	  undesired	  twists	  of	  destiny	  is	  still	  extremely	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  Moreover,	  even	  in	  the	  most	  scientifically	  and	  technologically	  advanced	  societies,	  several	  central	  issues	  still	  escape	  being	  framed	  by	  a	  causal,	  indexical	  mode	  of	  thinking	  (Bunzl	  2015).	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  devastating	  catastrophes	  that	  periodically	  strike	  humanity,	  killing	  thousands	  of	  people,	  such	  as	  earthquakes,	  tsunamis,	  or	  epidemics,	  are	  generated	  by	  invisible	  forces	  that	  scientific	  research	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  able	  to	  univocally	  link	  with	  visible	  phenomena	  anticipating	  them	  (Fra	  Paleo	  2015).	  Geologists	  continuously	  monitor	  the	  earth,	  searching	  for	  clues	  about	  when	  the	  next	  earthquake	  might	  happen.	  Contemporary	  seismology	  has	  developed	  incredibly	  sophisticated	  strategies	  and	  tools	  in	  order	  to	  both	  expand	  the	  range	  of	  such	  clues	  and	  improve	  the	  capacity	  of	  inferring	  from	  them	  the	  probability	  of	  future	  events	  (Coen	  2013).	  The	  territories	  of	  the	  two	  economically	  and	  technologically	  most	  advanced	  societies	  in	  the	  present-­‐day	  world,	  USA	  and	  Japan,	  include	  severely	  seismic	  areas;	  as	  a	  consequence,	  impressive	  scientific	  efforts	  are	  sustained	  and	  carried	  on	  in	  these	  two	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  the	  ability	  to	  foresee	  and	  prevent	  earthquakes	  (Stein	  2010;	  Smits	  2013;	  Smits	  2014).	  And	  yet,	  as	  the	  tragic	  events	  that	  struck	  Japan	  in	  March	  2011	  demonstrate,	  such	  efforts	  are	  still	  largely	  insufficient	  (Samuels	  2013).	  People	  in	  these	  countries	  still	  live	  in	  fear	  that	  a	  catastrophe	  might	  soon	  take	  place,	  unforeseeable,	  uncontrollable.	  The	  example	  of	  earthquakes	  brings	  back	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  visible	  and	  invisible,	  perceptible	  and	  imperceptible,	  manifest	  and	  secret.	  Modern	  seismology	  has	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come	  up	  with	  strategies	  and	  tools	  that	  widen	  the	  domain	  of	  perceptibility	  (Ferrari	  2014).	  Micro-­‐geological	  events	  likely	  to	  announce	  a	  future	  catastrophe	  can	  be	  detected	  as	  they	  would	  never	  in	  the	  past.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  secret	  lies	  in	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  earth	  that	  is	  still	  invisible	  to	  science.	  Something	  happens	  there	  that	  causes	  the	  catastrophe,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  only	  a	  posteriori,	  when	  the	  devastating	  earthquake	  has	  already	  happened,	  that	  the	  catastrophe	  can	  be	  indexically	  connected	  with	  what	  caused	  it.	  A	  priori,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  no	  events	  can	  be	  detected,	  even	  through	  sophisticate	  technology,	  that	  anticipate	  the	  calamity	  to	  happen.	  Perhaps	  in	  the	  future	  science	  will	  be	  able	  to	  enlarge	  the	  domain	  of	  perceptibility,	  diving	  into	  the	  nucleus	  of	  the	  earth,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  earthquakes	  will	  be	  predicted	  with	  timely	  and	  infallible	  efficaciousness	  (Massa	  and	  Camassi	  2013).	  In	  the	  meantime,	  though,	  the	  kind	  of	  discourse	  that	  circulates	  before	  and	  after	  one	  of	  such	  calamities	  reveals	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  emerges	  in	  human	  communities	  when	  science	  fails	  to	  explain	  and	  control	  the	  threatening	  forces	  of	  nature	  (Quarantelli	  1998).	  After	  the	  earthquake	  that	  devastated	  the	  Italian	  city	  of	  L’Aquila	  and	  the	  surrounding	  areas	  in	  April	  2009,	  killing	  hundreds	  of	  people	  and	  destroying	  houses	  and	  monuments,	  media	  dwelled	  at	  length	  on	  the	  story	  of	  Giampaolo	  Gioacchino	  Giuliani,iii	  an	  astrophysics	  technician	  who	  claimed	  to	  have	  predicted	  the	  event	  through	  a	  new	  seismographic	  technique	  based	  on	  releases	  of	  radon	  gas	  (Giuliani	  and	  Fiorani	  2009).	  Relatives	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  commentators	  were	  outraged	  that	  such	  maverick	  voice	  had	  not	  been	  listened	  to,	  and	  threatened	  to	  sue	  official	  seismologists	  and	  competent	  authorities.	  Scientists	  subsequently	  demonstrated,	  as	  it	  was	  obvious	  since	  the	  beginning,	  that	  the	  new	  method	  was	  actually	  not	  one	  (Kerr	  2009).	  The	  seismographic	  technique	  proposed	  by	  the	  independent	  researcher	  was	  indeed	  unable	  to	  single	  out	  a	  causal	  relation	  between	  perceptible	  geological	  events	  and	  imperceptible	  tectonic	  phenomena	  causing	  major	  earthquakes.	  In	  reality,	  the	  independent	  researcher	  was	  just	  exploiting	  the	  wave	  of	  irrationality	  produced	  by	  the	  earthquake	  in	  order	  to	  validate	  his	  seismologic	  theory	  against	  the	  mainstream	  one.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  mode	  of	  thinking	  was	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  an	  ancient	  haruspex	  than	  to	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  of	  an	  old	  physician.	  Ex	  post,	  he	  was	  arbitrarily	  associating	  seismographic	  data	  and	  seismic	  phenomena,	  claiming	  that	  the	  former	  were	  indexes	  of	  the	  latter.	  In	  reality,	  they	  were	  not	  indexes	  but	  symbols,	  which	  a	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  discourse	  connected	  with	  their	  cause.	  Scientists	  could	  easily	  falsify	  these	  pseudo-­‐causal	  theories.	  However,	  even	  nowadays	  there	  are	  people	  who	  believe	  that,	  by	  adopting	  such	  alternative	  seismographic	  strategy,	  lives	  could	  have	  been	  saved.	  The	  attention	  of	  media	  has	  meanwhile	  moved	  elsewhere,	  and	  yet	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  especially	  in	  social	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networks	  still	  linger	  the	  opinions	  of	  those	  who	  affirm	  that	  the	  truth	  was	  concealed	  on	  purpose,	  to	  cover	  responsibilities,	  or	  even	  to	  benefit	  those	  who	  speculated	  on	  reconstruction.	  More	  generally,	  the	  example	  offers	  a	  first	  answer	  about	  where	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  of	  ancient	  haruspices	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  present-­‐day	  technologically	  advanced	  societies.	  Every	  time	  that	  science	  fails	  in	  associating	  major	  calamities	  with	  phenomena	  or	  events	  whose	  early	  detection	  might	  predict	  or	  even	  control	  the	  catastrophe,	  media	  and	  communities	  circulate	  discourse	  in	  which	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  invisible,	  the	  perceptible	  and	  the	  imperceptible,	  are	  linked	  according	  to	  a	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  resembles	  that	  of	  ancient	  divination	  (Lebovic	  and	  Killen	  2014;	  November	  and	  Leanza	  2015).	  The	  unusual	  conformation	  of	  a	  sacrificed	  animal’s	  liver	  is	  visible	  evidence	  of	  the	  adversity	  of	  the	  gods,	  who	  will	  strike	  the	  community	  with	  a	  sudden	  calamity	  (Petropoulou	  2008).	  Analogously,	  the	  uncanny	  configuration	  of	  seismographic	  data	  is	  the	  perceptible	  effect	  of	  that	  which	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  earth,	  leading	  to	  a	  major	  catastrophe.	  In	  both	  cases,	  a	  connection	  is	  surmised	  whose	  rationale	  can	  neither	  be	  verbalized	  nor	  codified.	  Nobody	  interrogates	  the	  haruspex	  about	  how	  he	  came	  up	  with	  the	  connection,	  and	  no	  journalist	  really	  questions	  the	  independent	  scholar	  about	  his	  alleged	  capacity	  to	  save	  human	  lives.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  media	  lack	  scientific	  competence	  to	  challenge	  pseudo-­‐scientists,	  as	  ancient	  laymen	  would	  lack	  competence	  to	  question	  haruspices	  about	  their	  divination	  techniques.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  theories	  are	  not	  challenged	  for	  their	  circulation	  befits	  a	  fundamental	  purpose,	  and	  attracts	  attention	  and	  profits	  as	  a	  result:	  presenting	  symbolical	  connections	  as	  indexical	  links,	  pseudo-­‐scientists	  and	  media	  reinforce	  the	  trust	  in	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  detect	  and	  control	  nature,	  offering	  to	  bereaved	  relatives	  and	  terrified	  spectators	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  are	  not	  living	  in	  a	  chaotic,	  mysterious	  world	  but	  that,	  more	  simply,	  they	  are	  living	  in	  a	  world	  with	  a	  culprit.	  Indeed,	  when	  haruspices	  would	  single	  out	  and	  identify	  indexes	  in	  the	  internal	  organs	  of	  a	  sacrificed	  animal	  or	  in	  the	  flight	  of	  birds,	  they	  would	  not	  only	  associate	  the	  invisible	  forces	  looming	  large	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  community	  to	  the	  visible	  consequences	  of	  their	  capriciousness.	  They	  would	  introduce	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  agency,	  of	  a	  personal	  intentionality,	  behind	  those	  consequences	  (Leone	  2009	  Agency).	  An	  earthquake,	  a	  drought,	  or	  a	  famine	  were	  not	  simply	  the	  result	  of	  an	  impersonal,	  evil	  energy,	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  will,	  of	  a	  god	  whose	  cognitions,	  emotions,	  and	  actions	  closely	  resemble	  those	  of	  human	  beings.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  when	  pseudo-­‐science	  and	  media	  introduce	  a	  culprit	  into	  the	  scene	  of	  a	  catastrophe,	  they	  are	  not	  only	  activating	  a	  pseudo-­‐indexical	  mode	  of	  thinking	  through	  an	  arbitrary	  association,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  attributing	  a	  face,	  a	  will,	  an	  intentionality,	  and	  therefore	  an	  agency,	  to	  the	  catastrophe.	  Accepting	  that	  the	  catastrophe	  ‘just	  happened’,	  and	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that	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  do	  to	  prevent	  and	  divert	  it,	  is	  more	  difficult	  than	  accepting	  that	  the	  catastrophe	  happened	  because	  of	  a	  cause	  that	  could	  have	  been	  detected	  in	  advance,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  accept	  than	  the	  idea	  that	  someone	  actually	  wanted	  the	  catastrophe,	  and	  intentionally	  plotted	  so	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  prevented.	  Indeed,	  humanity	  is	  impotent	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  first	  hypothesis,	  and	  all	  it	  can	  do	  is	  just	  patiently	  wait	  for	  science	  to	  investigate	  further	  and	  become	  more	  efficient.	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  is	  more	  palatable	  because	  it	  comes	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  something	  can	  be	  done	  in	  the	  present	  time,	  just	  giving	  space	  and	  voice	  to	  those	  who	  are	  more	  proficient	  than	  mainstream	  scientists	  at	  detecting	  the	  visible	  omens	  of	  future,	  invisible	  catastrophes.	  However,	  the	  most	  satisfactory	  hypothesis	  is	  the	  third	  one.	  The	  evilness	  of	  nature	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  evilness	  of	  a	  personal,	  intentional	  agency.	  Hypotheses	  of	  this	  kind,	  albeit	  false,	  circulate	  widely,	  and	  are	  easily	  sold	  by	  the	  media,	  for	  they	  allow	  the	  reactivation	  of	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  human	  ‘agencies	  of	  redressing’.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  agencies	  is	  the	  law.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  culprit,	  then	  justice	  can	  and	  must	  be	  done,	  for	  the	  moral	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  in	  order	  for	  it	  not	  to	  happen	  anymore.	  In	  particular	  circumstances,	  then,	  contemporary	  humans	  still	  resort	  to	  the	  present-­‐day	  version	  of	  haruspices	  so	  as	  to	  illusorily	  reaffirm	  a	  sense	  of	  control	  over	  nature.	  Three	  main	  questions	  must	  be	  asked	  about	  the	  discourse	  of	  ‘modern	  divination’:	  first,	  what	  is	  its	  specificity	  in	  relation	  to	  similar	  modes	  of	  thinking	  in	  contemporary	  societies;	  second,	  what	  is	  its	  specific	  operational	  dynamic,	  for	  instance	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  selects	  and	  ‘frames’	  a	  culprit;	  and	  third,	  what	  is	  the	  role	  of	  semiotics,	  if	  any,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  haruspices	  of	  today.	  	  	  
6.	  The	  semiotic	  specificity	  of	  modern	  divination.	  	  A	  revealing	  indicator	  about	  a	  culture	  is	  its	  regime	  of	  temporality.	  Some	  societies	  insistently	  focus	  on	  the	  past,	  obsessively	  celebrating	  their	  mythical	  ancestors,	  narrating	  and	  re-­‐narrating	  the	  history	  of	  the	  community,	  preserving	  with	  apprehensive	  devotion	  every	  relic	  of	  the	  past.	  Other	  human	  groups,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  are	  completely	  absorbed	  by	  the	  present.	  They	  do	  not	  care	  about	  what	  preceded	  the	  instant	  in	  which	  they	  currently	  live,	  nor	  do	  they	  muse	  or	  plan	  about	  the	  future;	  the	  senses	  of	  the	  whole	  society	  are	  directed	  at	  a	  full	  immersion	  into	  what	  is	  thought,	  felt,	  and	  done	  on	  the	  spot.	  Finally,	  in	  this	  simple	  tripartite	  categorization,	  some	  cultures	  are	  constantly	  concentrating	  on	  their	  future.	  They	  do	  not	  cherish	  their	  history,	  nor	  do	  they	  enjoy	  the	  fleeting	  present,	  but	  tenaciously	  plan,	  project,	  foresee,	  and	  predict	  (Koselleck	  1979).	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Each	  of	  these	  temporal	  attitudes,	  then,	  can	  take	  two	  opposite	  emotional	  flavors:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  past,	  present,	  or	  future	  of	  a	  society	  will	  be	  respectively	  treasured	  with	  pride,	  consumed	  with	  voluptuousness,	  or	  awaited	  with	  hopefulness;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  will	  be	  looked	  at	  with	  regret	  or	  nostalgia,	  suffered	  in	  anguish,	  or	  anticipated	  in	  fear	  (Del	  Marco	  and	  Pezzini	  2012).	  In	  any	  case,	  both	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  past	  and	  anticipation	  of	  the	  future,	  whether	  they	  take	  place	  in	  joy	  or	  fear,	  anguish	  or	  nostalgia,	  require	  an	  intense	  activity	  bridging	  the	  material	  and	  the	  immaterial,	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  invisible	  (Lozano	  1987;	  Leone	  2014	  Longing).	  ‘Societies	  of	  the	  past’	  cannot	  limit	  themselves	  to	  worship	  their	  relics;	  they	  must	  also	  reconnect	  these	  traces	  of	  a	  remote	  eon	  to	  full	  representations	  of	  it,	  to	  figurations	  that	  recreate	  a	  perceptible	  simulacrum	  of	  a	  vanished	  past	  through	  the	  surviving	  vestiges	  of	  it	  (Ginzburg	  	  2006;	  2014).	  Symmetrically,	  ‘societies	  of	  the	  future’	  must	  invest	  cognitive	  and	  also	  emotional	  resources	  to	  project	  in	  front	  of	  themselves	  a	  full	  scenario	  of	  how	  the	  life	  of	  individuals	  and	  communities	  will	  be	  (Boscaljon	  2014).	  This	  operation	  too	  entails	  creating	  a	  meaningful	  relation	  between	  present	  perceptions	  and	  speculations	  about	  the	  future.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  modes	  of	  thinking	  that	  were	  described	  above	  can	  be	  adopted	  so	  as	  to	  elaborate	  a	  society’s	  discourse	  of	  the	  past/the	  future.	  From	  this	  specific	  point	  of	  view,	  contemporary	  archeology	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  modern	  seismology:	  they	  both	  seek	  for	  establishing	  indexical	  connections	  between	  traces	  and	  representations;	  the	  former	  creates	  simulacra	  of	  past	  epochs	  around	  archeological	  vestiges	  (Cohen	  2011);	  the	  latter	  produces	  representations	  of	  future	  states	  around	  geological	  clues.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  operation	  of	  retrospective/prospective	  simulation	  of	  the	  past/the	  future	  is	  entrusted	  to	  professionals,	  whose	  ability	  to	  detect	  and	  re-­‐elaborate	  traces	  spans	  over	  a	  larger	  range,	  thanks	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  operate	  by	  means	  of	  sophisticate	  ‘reconstructive’	  technology.	  However,	  like	  seismologic	  anticipations	  of	  the	  future,	  so	  also	  archeological	  and	  historical	  reconstructions	  of	  the	  past	  can	  be	  infiltrated	  by	  pseudo-­‐indexical	  logics,	  which	  seem	  to	  connect	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  invisible	  through	  causal	  links,	  but	  actually	  bring	  forth	  arbitrary	  simulacra	  (Geary	  and	  Klaniczay	  2013).	  That	  is	  the	  case	  of	  revisionism,	  whose	  manipulation	  of	  agency	  is	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  (Shermer	  2000).	  In	  conspiracy	  theories,	  a	  scapegoat	  is	  identified	  so	  as	  to	  introduce	  a	  personal,	  intentional	  agency	  into	  the	  explanation	  of	  how	  mysterious	  forces	  alter	  and	  endanger	  the	  life	  of	  a	  community	  (Butter	  2014).	  Accusing	  scientists	  of	  purposely	  hiding	  evidence	  about	  earthquakes	  reintroduce	  a	  logic	  of	  control	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  escapes	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  predict	  and	  divert	  a	  tragic	  future.	  However,	  societies	  of	  the	  past	  are	  not	  immune	  from	  this	  agentive	  fallacy.	  The	  past	  is,	  by	  definition,	  what	  cannot	  be	  changed.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  control	  and	  agency	  of	  human	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communities	  even	  more	  than	  the	  future	  is.	  A	  past	  war	  and	  its	  tragic	  toll	  of	  casualties	  weigh	  on	  a	  community’s	  feeling	  of	  impotence	  even	  more	  than	  a	  future,	  unpredictable	  calamity	  does	  (Violi	  2014).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  revisionism	  serves	  the	  same	  social	  purpose	  as	  conspiracy	  theories.	  It	  empowers	  communities	  by	  bestowing	  upon	  them	  the	  delusional	  sentiment	  that	  the	  past	  too	  can	  be	  changed,	  for	  instance	  by	  coming	  up	  with	  representations	  that	  deny	  indexical	  evidence	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  pseudo-­‐causal	  connections,	  identifying	  agencies	  and	  responsibilities	  that	  were	  unseen	  theretofore.	  To	  recapitulate,	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  of	  haruspices	  is	  at	  work	  in	  contemporary	  societies	  not	  only	  as	  regards	  unfounded	  prospections	  into	  the	  future,	  but	  also	  as	  regards	  undocumented	  retrospections	  into	  the	  past.	  In	  both	  cases,	  visible	  traces	  (seismologic	  graphs,	  archaeological	  evidence)	  are	  arbitrarily	  connected	  with	  representations	  (prediction	  of	  catastrophes,	  historical	  scenarios)	  of	  their	  invisible	  contexts	  (future	  states	  of	  calamity,	  past	  courses	  of	  action)	  but	  presented	  as	  results	  of	  specific	  agencies,	  as	  past	  or	  future	  effects	  of	  specific	  causes.	  ‘Modern	  divination’,	  then,	  can	  be	  detected	  in	  societies	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  past,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  societies	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  future,	  every	  time	  that	  the	  gap	  between	  what	  is	  known	  and	  what	  is	  no	  longer	  (past)	  or	  not	  yet	  (future)	  known	  is	  filled	  by	  resorting	  to	  symbolical,	  arbitrary	  simulacra.	  There	  is	  no	  indexical	  link	  between	  available	  seismologic	  evidence	  and	  earthquakes	  predicted	  by	  pseudo-­‐scientists,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  indexical	  link	  between	  available	  archeological	  evidence	  and	  scenarios	  reconstructed	  by	  pseudo-­‐historians,	  and	  yet	  they	  both	  proliferate	  and	  thrive	  because	  they	  introduce	  a	  hostile	  agency	  into	  an	  otherwise	  impersonal	  narrative	  scene.	  By	  surmising	  a	  conspiracy	  aimed	  at	  silencing	  non-­‐mainstream	  scientists	  in	  order	  to	  profit	  from	  unpredicted	  calamities	  or	  at	  censoring	  alternative	  historians	  so	  as	  to	  serve	  the	  ideology	  of	  a	  ruling	  lobby,	  contemporary	  haruspices	  actually	  convey	  a	  message	  that	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  that	  entailed	  by	  their	  ancient	  colleagues:	  the	  community	  is	  intentionally	  left	  bereft	  of	  knowledge	  and	  control	  over	  either	  its	  past	  or	  its	  future;	  haruspices	  deserve	  power	  and	  consideration	  because	  they	  know	  how	  to	  redress	  such	  unbalance.	  The	  discourse	  of	  haruspices	  then	  usually	  generates	  a	  vicious	  circle	  in	  which	  they	  offer	  the	  representation	  of	  an	  empowered	  community	  but	  simultaneously	  are	  empowered	  by	  the	  community	  they	  claim	  to	  empower.	  Through	  fallacious	  representations	  of	  the	  past	  or	  the	  future,	  they	  soothe	  the	  anguish	  of	  their	  contemporaries	  but	  receive	  real	  power	  in	  recompense.	  Thus	  far,	  the	  first	  of	  the	  questions	  above	  has	  been	  answered,	  namely,	  what	  is	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	  that	  was	  characteristic	  of	  ancient	  haruspices	  and	  in	  what	  modern	  versions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  contemporary	  societies.	  Prospective	  and	  retrospective	  creation	  of	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pseudo-­‐indexical	  links	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  this	  particular	  mode	  of	  thinking.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  describing	  in	  detail	  how	  these	  pseudo-­‐causal	  simulacra	  are	  brought	  about.	  The	  main	  question	  to	  answer	  to	  this	  regard	  is:	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  point	  at	  a	  cause,	  where	  there	  isn’t	  any?	  	  	  
7.	  The	  semiotic	  invention	  of	  causes.	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  above,	  one	  must	  first	  investigate	  the	  nature	  of	  indexicality.	  When	  is	  it	  that	  a	  causal	  connection,	  relying	  upon	  contiguity	  of	  forces,	  can	  be	  established	  between	  what	  is	  perceptible	  and	  what	  is	  not?	  For	  instance,	  how	  was	  it	  possible	  to	  determine	  that	  the	  development	  of	  lung	  cancer	  is	  the	  direct	  consequence	  of	  a	  life	  habit	  of	  tobacco	  smoking,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  two	  elements	  are	  currently	  strongly	  interconnected	  and	  almost	  replaceable?	  Today,	  when	  we	  see	  a	  relative	  or	  close	  friend	  smoking,	  we	  immediately	  feel	  preoccupation	  at	  the	  consequent	  idea	  that	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  develop	  lung	  cancer.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  when	  we	  know	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  suffering	  from	  lung	  cancer,	  the	  question	  that	  immediately	  forms	  in	  our	  mind	  is	  “was	  he	  or	  she	  a	  smoker?”	  However,	  for	  as	  much	  natural	  this	  two-­‐way	  connection	  might	  seem	  nowadays,	  it	  has	  taken	  a	  long	  time,	  and	  huge	  efforts,	  to	  establish	  itself	  in	  most	  western	  societies	  (Berridge	  2013).	  French	  movies	  from	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  feature	  heroes	  who	  are	  constantly	  chain-­‐smoking,	  lighting	  cigarettes	  in	  rapid	  succession	  and	  filling	  the	  scene	  with	  thick,	  greyish	  clouds	  (Lovato	  2003;	  Gombeaud	  2008).	  At	  that	  time,	  though,	  spectators	  would	  not	  think	  “this	  character	  is	  going	  to	  develop	  lung	  cancer”;	  or	  “this	  character	  is	  a	  bad	  example	  for	  teenagers”,	  since	  smoking	  was	  a	  perceptible	  element	  that	  culture	  would	  connect	  with	  many	  invisible	  connotations,	  but	  none	  of	  them	  included	  the	  causal	  relation	  between	  smoking	  tobacco	  and	  developing	  lung	  cancer.	  The	  aura	  emanating	  from	  cigarettes	  in	  cinema	  and	  popular	  culture	  was	  symbolically	  attached	  to	  them:	  holding	  a	  cigarette	  between	  one’s	  fingers	  was	  the	  indispensable	  mark	  of	  smartness.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  connotation	  of	  cinematic	  smoking	  to	  turn	  from	  symbolical	  into	  indexical,	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  smoking	  was	  eventually	  banned	  from	  movies,	  a	  long	  scientific	  and	  legal	  battle	  had	  to	  be	  engaged	  (Timmermann	  2014).	  First,	  medical	  evidence	  had	  to	  be	  gathered	  and	  corroborated,	  pointing	  at	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  habit	  and	  disease.	  Then,	  such	  indexical	  connection	  had	  to	  gain	  momentum	  and	  strength	  in	  society,	  politics,	  and	  law.	  Huge	  economic	  interests	  were	  at	  stake,	  and	  tobacco	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lobbies	  sought	  for	  years	  to	  construct	  counter-­‐representations,	  claiming	  that	  medical	  research	  on	  lung	  cancer	  was	  following	  the	  wrong	  hypothesis	  (Linder	  2012).	  The	  example	  shows	  what	  is	  needed	  for	  an	  indexical	  connection	  to	  take	  place	  in	  culture:	  the	  mark	  and	  its	  invisible	  content	  must,	  of	  course,	  be	  related	  through	  a	  link	  of	  physical	  and	  causal	  contiguity,	  like	  fire	  and	  smoke.	  Today,	  thanks	  to	  medical	  research,	  we	  know	  that	  tobacco	  smoking	  provokes	  lung	  cancer,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  law	  of	  many	  countries	  obliges	  cigarettes	  producers	  to	  write	  it	  black	  on	  white	  on	  cigarette	  packs.	  Indeed,	  nobody	  yet,	  not	  even	  medical	  research	  financed	  by	  tobacco	  lobbies,	  was	  able	  to	  prove	  the	  opposite.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  issue	  is	  not	  controversial	  anymore	  (Proctor	  2011).	  Nevertheless,	  establishing	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  tobacco	  and	  cancer	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  turn	  the	  former	  into	  an	  index	  of	  the	  latter,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  connection	  must	  be	  recognized	  as	  such.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  connection	  must	  become	  part	  of	  knowledge	  shared	  by	  a	  certain	  community	  and	  taken	  for	  granted	  as	  a	  habit,	  as	  a	  relation	  that	  is	  not	  questioned	  any	  longer.	  That	  is	  how	  an	  indexical	  connection	  takes	  place	  in	  culture,	  becoming	  ground	  for	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  communicative	  actions.	  If	  today	  someone	  dares	  smoking	  in	  a	  school,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  have	  him	  or	  her	  immediately	  censored	  and	  fined	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  tobacco	  smoking	  and	  lung	  cancer	  has	  taken	  indexical	  force	  in	  society.	  The	  smoker	  is	  seen	  as	  someone	  who	  is	  directly	  injecting	  the	  sparkle	  of	  cancer	  in	  our	  veins.	  That	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  indexicality,	  but	  that	  is	  also	  its	  weakness.	  Indeed,	  the	  example	  above	  suggests	  that	  for	  a	  causal	  relation	  to	  develop	  binding	  evidence	  and	  pragmatic	  force	  in	  society,	  corroborating	  its	  subsistence	  through	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  It	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  such	  relation,	  testing	  it	  through	  experiments	  or	  corroborating	  it	  by	  statistics,	  while	  falsifying	  and	  rejecting	  opposite	  hypotheses.	  For	  the	  causal	  relation	  to	  become	  an	  indexical	  bind,	  it	  must	  become	  a	  cultural	  habit.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  that	  is	  true	  for	  non-­‐indexical	  relations	  too.	  There	  is	  no	  causal	  connection	  between	  chain-­‐smoking	  in	  a	  movie	  and	  displaying	  charisma;	  it	  is	  an	  association	  that	  developed	  movie	  after	  movie,	  perhaps	  also	  at	  the	  urge	  of	  the	  tobacco	  industry.	  Smoking	  hero	  after	  smoking	  hero,	  it	  became	  awkward	  for	  spectators	  to	  see	  protagonists	  gesture	  empty-­‐handed;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  a	  true	  hero	  had	  to	  constantly	  manipulate	  a	  cigarette	  and	  its	  accessories,	  turned	  into	  visible,	  symbolical	  reminders	  of	  the	  protagonist’s	  charismatic	  and	  erotic	  force.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  icons:	  for	  a	  gesture	  to	  become	  iconic,	  and	  develop	  a	  relation	  with	  a	  prototype,	  such	  relation	  cannot	  be	  established	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  resemblance.	  It	  must	  also	  be	  deposited	  in	  the	  cultural	  awareness	  of	  the	  community,	  thus	  becoming	  a	  habit.	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This	  long	  explanation	  was	  necessary	  to	  introduce	  the	  main	  mechanism	  through	  which	  contemporary	  divination	  works.	  It	  bestows	  the	  force	  of	  a	  habit	  upon	  a	  non-­‐causal	  connection,	  thus	  pretending	  that	  it	  is	  an	  indexical	  one.	  It	  links	  two	  elements,	  a	  perceptible	  mark	  and	  its	  invisible	  content,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  connection	  becomes	  culturally	  recognized	  although	  it	  is	  empirically	  unfounded.	  For	  instance,	  that	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  most	  medical	  conspiracy	  theories	  work.	  There	  is	  no	  corroborating	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  vaccines	  cause	  autism	  (Gerber	  and	  Offit	  2009;	  DeStefano	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Yet,	  conspiracy	  theories	  generate	  a	  discourse	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  former	  and	  the	  latter	  is	  presented	  as	  endowed	  with	  the	  same	  causal	  indexicality	  linking	  tobacco	  smoking	  and	  lung	  cancer	  (as	  an	  example,	  see	  the	  infamous	  article	  Wakefield	  et	  al.	  1998,	  which	  started	  the	  controversy	  on	  autism	  and	  vaccination).	  Associating	  autism	  and	  vaccines	  becomes	  a	  social	  habit,	  silently	  spreading	  through	  informal	  conversation,	  social	  networks,	  and	  slowly	  but	  inexorably	  rising	  to	  the	  status	  of	  shared,	  unquestioned	  knowledge	  (Oliver	  and	  Wood	  2014).	  There	  is	  not	  too	  much	  difference	  between	  the	  ancient	  haruspex	  who,	  having	  singled	  out	  some	  marks	  in	  the	  internal	  organs	  of	  a	  sacrificed	  animal,	  would	  announce	  to	  the	  community	  that	  these	  marks	  would	  stand	  for	  the	  anger	  of	  the	  gods	  —	  thus	  being	  a	  causal,	  indexical	  effect	  of	  it	  —	  and	  the	  conspiracy	  theorist	  who,	  having	  selected	  an	  element	  whatsoever	  that	  happens	  to	  sometimes	  co-­‐occur	  with	  autism,	  such	  as	  being	  vaccinated,	  proclaims	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  former.	  In	  both	  cases,	  a	  casual	  relation	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  causal	  link,	  and	  turned	  into	  an	  indexical	  bind	  by	  the	  force	  of	  the	  habit.	  The	  question	  to	  be	  asked	  at	  this	  stage	  is:	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  a	  symbolical	  connection,	  arbitrarily	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  known	  and	  unknown,	  perceptible	  and	  imperceptible,	  visible	  and	  invisible,	  turns	  into	  a	  cultural	  habit	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  causal	  connection	  does?	  In	  other	  words,	  shouldn’t	  the	  discourse	  of	  science	  on	  autism	  and	  its	  causes	  hold	  a	  greater	  place	  in	  the	  shared	  knowledge	  of	  a	  present-­‐day	  community	  than	  conspiracy	  theories	  proposing	  arbitrary	  explanations	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  indexicality?	  How	  can	  a	  symbolical	  connection	  rule	  and	  bind	  as	  much	  or	  even	  more	  than	  a	  causal	  one?	  Again,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  on	  earthquakes,	  pseudo-­‐medical	  explanations	  spread	  and	  dominate	  not	  because	  they	  find	  a	  cause,	  but	  because	  they	  display	  one.	  They	  introduce	  a	  personal,	  intentional	  agency	  in	  a	  scenario	  that	  science	  would	  rather	  leave	  without	  culprits,	  or	  with	  the	  indication	  of	  many	  culprits.	  Arbitrary	  connection	  between	  vaccination	  and	  autism	  takes	  the	  indexical	  force	  and	  the	  cultural	  value	  of	  a	  causal	  link	  because	  it	  identifies	  a	  human	  will	  beyond	  an	  evil,	  exactly	  like	  haruspices	  would	  explain	  calamities	  as	  consequence	  of	  the	  gods’	  hostility,	  uncannily	  displaying	  itself	  in	  an	  animal’s	  intestines.	  The	  comparison	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leads	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  what	  turns	  an	  association	  of	  two	  elements	  —	  a	  mark	  and	  its	  supposed	  invisible	  content	  —	  into	  a	  habit	  is	  largely	  independent	  from	  the	  content.	  It	  is	  independent	  from	  the	  mark	  as	  well.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  this	  independence	  that	  a	  farfetched	  conspiracy	  theory	  can	  gain	  the	  same	  cultural	  status	  as	  a	  corroborated	  empirical	  hypothesis.	  Further	  evidence	  of	  this	  independence	  is	  that	  the	  visible	  terms	  of	  ‘modern	  divination’	  can	  be	  replaced	  as	  freely	  as	  the	  perceptible	  omens	  of	  ancient	  divination,	  without	  any	  decrease	  in	  the	  power	  of	  generating	  indexical	  illusion.	  Ancient	  divination	  relied	  on	  the	  most	  various	  marks:	  the	  shape	  of	  sacrificed	  animals’	  internal	  organs;	  the	  flight	  of	  birds;	  the	  lines	  on	  a	  person’s	  hand;	  on	  one’s	  forehead;	  etc.	  None	  of	  these	  marks	  were	  causally	  related	  to	  their	  supposed	  content;	  hence	  they	  were,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  interchangeable.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  conspiracy	  theories	  can	  easily	  replace	  the	  agent	  of	  conspiracy	  without	  losing	  their	  ability	  to	  spread	  pseudo-­‐indexical	  habits.	  Autism	  in	  children	  is	  caused	  by	  exposition	  to	  their	  parents’	  cell	  phones	  waves,	  they	  could	  claim.	  If	  the	  indexical	  illusion	  of	  ‘modern	  divination’	  is	  as	  independent	  from	  its	  specific	  content	  as	  that	  of	  ancient	  divination	  was,	  then	  where	  does	  it	  lie?	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  will	  claim	  that	  it	  lies	  in	  an	  effect	  of	  discourse;	  in	  a	  pattern;	  in	  a	  structure.	  What	  are	  the	  ingredients	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  effective	  instance	  of	  modern	  divination?	  Through	  what	  optical	  illusion	  can	  two	  causally	  unrelated	  elements	  be	  presented	  as	  causally	  related,	  gain	  indexical	  force,	  and	  turn	  into	  the	  interpretive	  habit	  of	  a	  community?	  Two	  keywords	  are	  fundamental	  in	  the	  elaboration	  of	  this	  illusion:	  agency	  and	  narrativity.	  	  	  
8.	  Agency	  and	  narrativity	  in	  contemporary	  divination.	  	  Recent	  cognitive	  theories	  suggest	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  read	  events	  in	  the	  environment	  as	  caused	  by	  agency	  might	  be	  the	  result	  of	  adaptive	  evolution	  (Boyd	  2009).	  Humans	  can	  elaborate	  mental	  representations	  in	  which	  phenomena	  do	  not	  only	  happen,	  but	  are	  provoked	  by	  other	  beings	  or	  entities	  provided	  with	  intentionality	  and	  agency,	  that	  is,	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  turn	  one’s	  internal	  representations	  into	  a	  course	  of	  action	  (Leone	  2009	  Attanti).	  Thanks	  to	  this	  adaptive	  ability,	  human	  beings	  can,	  among	  other	  things,	  try	  to	  predict	  and	  prevent	  a	  potential	  danger	  by	  associating	  its	  occurrence	  with	  that	  which	  is	  considered	  the	  agency	  that	  could	  bring	  it	  about	  (Sterelny	  2001).	  However,	  like	  many	  other	  adaptive	  cognitive	  features	  of	  human	  beings,	  the	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  environment	  through	  attribution	  of	  agency	  can	  backfire,	  especially	  if	  the	  environment	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  jungle	  where	  simple	  relations	  obtain	  between	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preys	  and	  predators,	  but	  a	  sophisticated	  symbolical	  environment	  in	  which	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  events	  take	  place	  automatically,	  or	  anyway	  without	  clear	  display	  of	  agency	  (Godfrey-­‐Smith	  2001).	  The	  financial	  crisis	  that	  has	  strangled	  most	  of	  the	  western	  world	  since	  2007-­‐2008	  is	  an	  excellent	  example.	  For	  many	  human	  beings	  who	  receive	  representations	  of	  the	  crisis	  through	  mass	  media,	  social	  networks,	  or	  through	  conversation	  with	  friends	  and	  relatives,	  the	  crisis	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  predator	  (Bauman	  2014).	  It	  threatens	  to	  snatch	  away	  from	  them	  their	  job,	  their	  security,	  and	  their	  dignity.	  For	  many,	  this	  threat	  has	  become	  a	  reality:	  because	  of	  the	  crisis,	  millions	  of	  people	  around	  the	  world	  have	  seen	  their	  professional	  and	  personal	  lives	  destroyed	  (Gamble	  2014).	  In	  verbal	  representations	  of	  this	  tragedy,	  the	  crisis	  is	  the	  subject.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  “crisis”	  is	  an	  abstract	  noun.	  Saying	  that	  “the	  crisis	  has	  disrupted	  the	  harmony	  of	  my	  family”	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  saying	  “a	  tiger	  has	  killed	  and	  devoured	  my	  children”.	  Human	  beings	  are	  biologically	  programmed	  to	  attribute	  intentionality	  and	  agency	  to	  a	  tiger,	  but	  not	  to	  an	  abstract	  entity	  like	  a	  financial	  crisis.	  A	  tiger	  is	  a	  hungry	  animal.	  In	  order	  to	  feed	  itself	  and	  its	  offspring,	  it	  has	  to	  kill	  and	  eat	  other	  animals.	  That	  is	  something	  that	  human	  beings	  too	  do,	  and	  recognize.	  They	  also	  are	  a	  dangerous	  agency	  for	  other	  animals.	  Being	  able	  to	  recognize	  the	  link	  between	  the	  aggression	  of	  a	  tiger	  and	  its	  agency	  is	  fundamental	  in	  order	  to	  foresee	  and	  possibly	  prevent	  the	  danger.	  The	  tiger	  attacks	  because	  it	  is	  hungry.	  It	  wants	  to	  eat,	  therefore	  plans	  and	  executes	  a	  course	  of	  action.	  If	  I,	  human	  being,	  understand	  this,	  then	  I	  can	  manage	  to	  protect	  my	  offspring	  and	  myself	  by	  avoiding	  the	  tiger,	  or	  even	  by	  learning	  to	  decode	  the	  traces	  that	  it	  leaves	  in	  the	  environment	  (Whiten	  1991).	  Strange	  swishes	  among	  the	  leaves	  can	  be	  detected	  and	  decoded	  as	  audible	  traces	  of	  an	  invisible	  and	  terrible	  agency,	  to	  be	  fled	  from	  by	  all	  means.	  But	  what	  are	  the	  traces	  announcing	  the	  approaching	  of	  a	  financial	  crisis?	  Some	  of	  the	  best	  economists	  of	  the	  world	  were	  unable	  to	  predict	  its	  advent,	  some	  others	  became	  world-­‐famous	  exactly	  because	  they	  anticipated	  what	  nobody	  was	  able	  to	  see	  come	  (Taleb	  2007).	  For	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people,	  however,	  there	  were	  absolutely	  no	  clues	  of	  what	  was	  going	  to	  happen	  and	  destroy	  their	  lives.	  Economic	  and	  financial	  indicators	  hastily	  running	  in	  the	  bottom	  banner	  of	  TV	  news	  were	  undecipherable	  hieroglyphs	  to	  them.	  Indeed,	  the	  main	  problem	  with	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  not	  that	  its	  looming	  was	  not	  announced	  by	  any	  understandable	  mark,	  but	  that	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  explain	  and,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  anticipate	  dangers	  through	  cognitive	  attributions	  of	  agency	  could	  not	  work	  in	  these	  circumstances	  (Bandura	  2006).	  What	  kind	  of	  an	  agent	  is,	  indeed,	  the	  crisis?	  The	  crisis	  is	  not	  a	  tiger,	  although	  it	  kills	  more	  than	  it.	  It	  is	  an	  abstract	  entity	  behind	  which	  a	  myriad	  of	  intricately	  interconnected	  phenomena	  lie.	  In	  front	  of	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this	  nebula	  of	  invisible	  agencies,	  media,	  experts,	  and	  lay	  people	  adopt	  exactly	  the	  same	  cognitive	  patterns	  that	  prehistoric	  human	  beings	  would	  resort	  to	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  aggressive	  behavior	  of	  a	  tiger.	  They	  seek	  to	  attribute	  an	  agency.	  However,	  the	  result	  is	  conducive	  to	  what	  has	  been	  labeled	  above	  as	  ‘modern	  divination’.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  abstract	  entities,	  deprived	  of	  any	  personal	  intentionality,	  are	  personalized	  and	  endowed	  with	  their	  own	  agency.	  Media	  start	  circulating	  representations	  in	  which	  “the	  crisis	  has	  started”;	  “the	  crisis	  is	  spreading”;	  “the	  crisis	  is	  taking	  its	  toll	  of	  jobs”;	  etc.	  (Greuter	  2014).	  In	  these	  and	  other	  representations,	  the	  crisis	  itself	  becomes	  a	  subject,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  ferocious	  animal	  whose	  deeds	  are	  totally	  independent	  from	  the	  agency	  of	  human	  beings.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  other	  agencies	  are	  singled	  out	  beyond	  that	  of	  the	  crisis,	  but	  attributed,	  again,	  to	  abstract,	  impersonal	  entities.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  media	  represent	  the	  financial	  markets	  is	  almost	  hilarious.	  In	  many	  cases,	  they	  are	  attributed	  not	  only	  personal	  agencies,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  malign	  spirits	  rampaging	  behind	  the	  curtains	  of	  the	  crisis;	  to	  complete	  the	  delusional	  effect	  of	  the	  human	  cognition	  of	  agency,	  they	  are	  given	  an	  emotional	  flavor	  too:	  “the	  markets	  suffer	  today”;	  “the	  markets	  today	  are	  shy”;	  “they	  are	  angry”;	  etc.	  (Peltzer,	  Lämmle,	  and	  Wagenknecht	  2012).	  The	  problem	  with	  these	  representations	  is	  that	  they	  have	  the	  same	  social	  effect	  that	  ancient	  divination	  would	  have	  when	  attributing	  the	  agency	  of	  famines	  or	  draughts	  to	  the	  gods’	  hostility.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  dissimulate	  human	  agencies	  lying	  beyond	  the	  calamity;	  angry	  gods,	  not	  the	  wrong	  decisions	  of	  the	  emperor,	  are	  starving	  the	  people	  (Starkman	  2014).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  since	  they	  offer	  representations	  that	  cannot	  satisfy	  the	  human	  instinct	  for	  agency	  attribution,	  they	  implicitly	  encourage	  the	  quest	  for	  a	  culprit,	  for	  the	  agent	  that	  truly	  provoked	  the	  catastrophe.	  A	  second	  keyword	  is	  essential	  to	  understand	  this	  passage:	  “narrativity”	  (Lorusso,	  Paolucci,	  and	  Violi	  2012).	  Indeed,	  when	  human	  beings	  adapt	  ancestral	  cognitive	  schemes	  to	  understand	  complex	  contemporary	  phenomena,	  they	  inevitably	  come	  up	  with	  unsatisfactory	  representations,	  which	  cannot	  result	  in	  any	  course	  of	  action.	  Human	  beings	  need	  to	  recognize	  the	  tiger	  as	  an	  agent	  not	  only	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  its	  aggression	  and	  predict	  its	  occurrence,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  have	  to	  posit	  an	  enemy	  to	  fight.	  But	  how	  can	  “the	  crisis”	  be	  fought	  and	  contrasted?	  Or	  how	  can	  “the	  markets”	  be	  attributed	  an	  agency	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  contrastive	  plan	  and	  course	  of	  action?	  Human	  beings	  look	  for	  a	  culprit	  that	  they	  can	  posit	  as	  a	  counter-­‐subject	  in	  a	  narrative,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  must	  attribute	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  catastrophe	  not	  to	  an	  impersonal	  entity	  but	  to	  a	  personal	  enemy,	  which	  can	  be	  fought,	  persecuted,	  and	  eliminated	  exactly	  like	  a	  tiger	  in	  a	  jungle.	  How	  human	  groups	  select	  the	  personal	  agent	  to	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which	  they	  attribute	  the	  role	  of	  the	  foe	  in	  a	  narrative	  scheme	  of	  representation	  and	  action	  is	  what	  the	  following	  paragraphs	  will	  deal	  with.	  According	  to	  Algirdas	  J.	  Greimas’	  generative	  semiotics,	  a	  narrative	  drive	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  every	  cultural	  manifestation	  (Greimas	  1970).	  Classical	  narratives,	  such	  as	  folk	  tales,	  for	  instance,	  are	  the	  most	  typical	  embodiment	  of	  this	  mechanism	  (Greimas	  1985).	  Through	  these	  texts,	  a	  society	  creates	  and	  circulates	  a	  discourse	  in	  which	  central	  values	  are	  affirmed	  and	  re-­‐affirmed.	  Indeed,	  since	  societies	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  passing	  of	  time,	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  succession	  of	  generations	  and	  the	  menace	  of	  oblivion,	  values	  must	  be	  enshrined	  in	  cultural	  artifacts	  that	  survive	  the	  accidents	  of	  time.	  Non-­‐genetically	  transmitted	  patrimony	  of	  humanity,	  culture	  is	  the	  series	  of	  choices	  that	  a	  society	  wants	  to	  hand	  down	  to	  its	  future,	  having	  inherited	  it	  from	  its	  past	  (Leone	  2010	  Analisi).	  Some	  human	  groups	  have	  found	  that	  freedom	  is	  an	  essential	  value	  for	  their	  prosperity.	  This	  value	  has	  affirmed	  itself	  through	  historical,	  political	  and	  social	  events,	  like	  revolutions	  for	  instance.	  Yet,	  for	  the	  memory	  and	  effective	  presence	  of	  this	  value	  to	  persist	  in	  society,	  freedom	  must	  be	  not	  only	  inculcated	  through	  abstract	  education,	  but	  also	  inscribed	  in	  the	  social	  psyche	  through	  narratives,	  which	  coat	  this	  value	  with	  the	  tricks	  and	  twists	  of	  storytelling	  (Früh	  and	  Frey	  2014).	  One	  of	  the	  great	  intuitions	  of	  Greimas	  for	  the	  development	  of	  cultural	  theory	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  values	  that	  are	  able	  to	  transmogrify	  into	  stories	  enjoy	  a	  quasi-­‐evolutionary	  benefit	  (Greimas	  1976).	  They	  survive	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  and	  defy	  forgetfulness	  because	  they	  are	  remembered	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  heroes	  and	  foes.	  The	  Western	  culture	  has	  reveled	  in	  the	  deeds	  of	  these	  heroes	  —	  despising	  their	  enemies	  —	  for	  millennia,	  along	  the	  two	  main	  lines	  of	  the	  Homeric	  narratives	  and	  the	  Biblical	  ones.	  Listeners,	  then	  readers	  of	  these	  stories	  have	  cognitively	  but	  above	  all	  emotionally	  partaken	  in	  siding	  with	  the	  characters	  of	  these	  stories,	  escaping	  with	  them	  from	  the	  captivity	  of	  an	  evil	  King	  or	  combating	  an	  invading	  population;	  yet,	  Greimas	  and	  his	  semiotics	  suggest	  that	  underneath	  this	  enjoyment,	  invisible	  to	  most	  but	  the	  analysts	  of	  narration,	  runs	  the	  impersonal	  discourse	  in	  which	  neither	  human	  beings	  nor	  gods	  oppose	  and	  fight	  each	  other,	  but	  values,	  ways	  of	  understanding	  human	  life,	  and	  arranging	  its	  social	  institutions	  accordingly	  (Greimas	  1976).	  The	  story	  of	  Moses	  continues	  to	  morph	  epoch	  after	  epoch	  into	  ever	  changing	  expressive	  formulae,	  from	  the	  verbal	  encoding	  of	  the	  Bible	  to	  its	  visual	  rendering	  by	  3D	  cinematic	  narratives	  (Leone	  2014	  L’anima);	  yet,	  beneath	  these	  variations,	  there	  persists	  an	  invisible	  structure	  that,	  through	  different	  means,	  reiterates	  the	  same	  message	  to	  each	  generation	  of	  human	  beings,	  a	  message	  in	  which	  freedom	  and	  identity	  overcome	  captivity	  and	  alienation.	  The	  same	  master	  character	  of	  this	  narrative,	  an	  imperceptible	  but	  personal	  god	  leading	  his	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people	  toward	  liberation	  and	  self-­‐awareness,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  structural	  semiotics	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  cultural	  and	  social	  instance	  that	  promotes	  this	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  humanity	  as	  endowed	  with	  transcendent	  liberty.	  Yet,	  as	  Greimas	  suggests,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  subsistence	  of	  human	  access	  to	  transcendent	  liberty	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  its	  grasp	  on	  human	  beings	  were	  it	  not	  translated	  into	  the	  titanic	  will	  of	  Moses,	  and	  the	  awe-­‐inducing	  mastery	  of	  his	  god,	  and	  the	  heinous	  antagonism	  of	  the	  pharaoh.	  The	  patterning	  force	  of	  narratives	  is	  such	  that,	  as	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  human	  beings	  do	  not	  seek	  for	  stories	  only	  in	  culture,	  but	  also	  in	  society	  and,	  paradoxically,	  in	  nature	  (Marrone	  2012).	  A	  disrupting	  financial	  crisis	  or	  a	  devastating	  earthquake	  do	  not	  remain	  as	  abstract	  events	  in	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  but	  immediately	  turn	  into	  agents,	  into	  subjects	  that	  move	  about	  in	  society	  and	  act,	  leaving	  behind	  disastrous	  signs	  of	  their	  passage,	  deeds,	  and	  even	  emotions.	  Earthquakes	  and	  financial	  crises	  rage	  through	  society,	  seen	  by	  their	  victims	  as	  protean	  monsters,	  but	  their	  abstractness	  is	  nevertheless	  too	  great	  to	  satisfy	  the	  human	  appetite	  for	  stories,	  protagonists,	  heroes,	  and	  villains.	  As	  epical	  or	  mythical	  narratives	  provide	  collectivities	  with	  the	  personification	  of	  a	  social	  order,	  in	  which	  certain	  values	  triumph	  over	  certain	  other	  values	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  heroes	  and	  foes,	  so	  the	  social	  imaginaire	  needs	  to	  explain	  and	  rearrange	  the	  disorder	  of	  calamities	  by	  reproducing	  the	  narrative	  pattern	  that	  divides	  evil	  and	  good	  and	  personifies	  them	  through	  culprits	  and	  victims,	  villains	  and	  avengers	  (Carr	  2014).	  That	  is	  the	  ultimate	  nature	  of	  conspiracy	  theories:	  reintroducing	  a	  patterning	  order	  that	  applies	  a	  narrative	  logic	  to	  social	  events,	  be	  they	  historical	  or	  present,	  and	  identifying	  a	  personal	  mask	  for	  impersonal	  values	  (Caumanns	  and	  Niendorf	  2001).	  The	  projection	  of	  this	  mask	  on	  the	  negative	  values	  that	  circulate	  in	  society	  through	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  for	  instance,	  allows	  societies	  to	  reassure	  themselves	  through	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  culprit.	  Those	  who	  create,	  elaborate,	  or	  disseminate	  conspiracy	  theories	  semiotically	  work	  like	  haruspices:	  they	  connect	  present	  traces	  to	  supposed	  agencies,	  fabricating	  an	  illusion	  of	  indexicality.	  An	  example	  will	  better	  clarify	  such	  dynamics.	  On	  January	  24,	  2015,	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  through	  his	  Director,	  Mr	  Mario	  Draghi,	  and	  the	  media	  announced	  that	  unprecedented	  resources	  of	  the	  ECB	  would	  be	  used,	  in	  the	  next	  year,	  to	  purchase	  public	  debt	  from	  European	  countries	  struck	  by	  the	  crisis.	  Headlines	  in	  newspapers,	  TV	  programs,	  and	  websites	  all	  used	  the	  same	  pattern:	  they	  pointed	  out	  how	  “stock	  exchange	  markets	  were	  celebrating”;	  “financial	  markets	  were	  euphoric”;	  “the	  Euro	  was	  breathing	  again”;	  etc.	  However,	  few	  commentators	  explained	  in	  detail	  how	  this	  massive	  anti-­‐crisis	  measures	  would	  affect	  common	  citizens	  and,	  even	  more	  importantly,	  they	  did	  not	  attach	  a	  personal	  agency	  to	  the	  image	  of	  “triumphant	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markets”.	  In	  most	  cases,	  readers	  of	  such	  titles	  were	  left	  alone	  with	  the	  task	  of	  associating	  a	  face,	  and	  a	  name,	  to	  such	  abstract	  designation	  of	  emotional	  status.	  Who	  are	  the	  individuals,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  groups,	  who	  would	  be	  “celebrating”	  the	  Central	  European	  Bank’s	  purchase	  of	  public	  debt?	  And	  whose	  are	  the	  lungs	  that	  are	  “breathing	  better”	  at	  such	  news?	  (Greuter	  2014)	  Contemporary	  haruspices	  intervene	  exactly	  to	  obviate	  this	  lack	  of	  personal	  indexicality.	  Since	  the	  hands	  and	  faces	  behind	  macro-­‐financial	  actions	  cannot	  be	  detected,	  present-­‐time	  haruspices	  garner	  traces	  from	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  global	  media	  discourse	  in	  order	  to	  attach	  them	  to	  a	  persona.	  In	  several	  circumstances,	  this	  modern	  divinatory	  operation	  follows	  a	  predetermined	  pattern,	  and	  insists	  on	  the	  same	  line	  of	  pseudo-­‐indexicality:	  those	  who	  are	  celebrating	  are	  a	  lobby	  of	  powerful	  individuals,	  belonging	  to	  an	  organized	  but	  secret	  group,	  who	  are	  maneuvering	  behind	  the	  curtains	  in	  order	  to	  displace	  huge	  amounts	  of	  public	  resources	  into	  private	  pockets	  and	  enslave	  larger	  and	  larger	  sections	  of	  the	  public	  opinion	  (Bilewicz	  2015).	  In	  Greimasian	  terms,	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  macro-­‐financial	  action	  by	  an	  institutional	  actor	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  impersonal	  passions	  that	  it	  triggers	  moves	  the	  public	  opinion,	  led	  by	  opinion	  leaders-­‐haruspices,	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  and	  the	  personification	  of	  a	  “sender”	  (Danblon	  and	  Loïc	  2010).	  The	  agency	  behind	  the	  anti-­‐crisis	  measure	  is	  given	  the	  mask	  of	  a	  social	  group,	  and	  pseudo-­‐indexical	  ties	  are	  established	  between	  what	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  media	  arena	  and	  supposedly	  invisible	  lobbies	  acting	  in	  the	  mysterious	  background	  of	  global	  economy.	  The	  irrational	  creation	  of	  an	  evil	  “sender”,	  which	  motivates	  and	  empowers	  the	  hand	  of	  institutional	  subjects	  like	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  is	  the	  necessary	  step	  to	  underline	  an	  axiology,	  and	  therefore	  the	  opposition	  between	  a	  secret,	  invisible	  force	  and	  the	  painful	  effects	  it	  produces	  in	  history.	  In	  ancient	  divination,	  haruspices	  would	  explain	  natural	  catastrophes	  or	  war	  defeats	  by	  attributing	  their	  responsibility	  to	  invisible	  gods,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  appeased	  in	  order	  for	  the	  curse	  to	  be	  removed;	  in	  modern	  divination,	  faceless	  global	  changes	  are	  linked	  with	  pseudo-­‐personal	  agents,	  which	  become	  culprits	  and	  targets	  of	  public	  indignation.	  It	  is	  fundamental	  to	  underline	  that	  indignation	  is	  not	  the	  problem.	  Suffering	  generated	  by	  the	  economic	  crisis	  in	  Europe,	  and	  especially	  in	  Southern-­‐European	  countries,	  is	  not	  imaginary.	  It	  is	  confirmed	  both	  by	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data.	  Statistics	  bear	  out	  the	  distress	  of	  societies,	  the	  dramatic	  unemployment	  of	  young	  people,	  the	  population	  decline.	  Personal	  and	  public	  narratives	  add	  a	  qualitative	  voice	  to	  numbers:	  people	  despair,	  leave	  their	  country,	  or	  even	  put	  an	  end	  to	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  most	  dramatic	  cases.	  However,	  to	  a	  dispassionate	  observer,	  indignation	  appears	  misplaced	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  manipulated.	  Negative	  emotional	  energy	  is	  directed	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toward	  the	  supposed	  agents	  of	  public	  suffering,	  but	  few	  give	  rational	  directions	  in	  order	  to	  channel	  such	  anger.	  Two	  cases	  most	  commonly	  occur:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  agency	  behind	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  the	  human	  disasters	  it	  provokes	  remains	  abstract,	  impersonal,	  and	  faceless.	  People	  are	  encouraged	  to	  voice	  their	  complaint,	  but	  this	  voice	  has	  no	  object,	  and	  therefore	  no	  pragmatic	  grasp	  over	  society	  and	  its	  economy.	  Present-­‐day	  haruspices	  benefit	  from	  public	  anger	  but	  do	  not	  direct	  it	  toward	  a	  target,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  do	  not	  promote	  change.	  To	  pamphleteers	  that	  accuse	  the	  invisible	  god	  of	  the	  markets	  as	  responsible	  of	  public	  distress,	  it	  is	  utterly	  convenient	  that	  such	  distress	  does	  not	  find	  its	  cause,	  and	  does	  not	  act	  to	  remove	  it.	  It	  is	  ignorance	  of	  the	  invisible	  hands	  behind	  the	  visible	  signs	  of	  catastrophe,	  indeed,	  that	  justifies	  the	  practice	  of	  present-­‐day	  divination.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  agency	  behind	  suffering	  is	  displayed,	  but	  through	  the	  fabrication	  of	  pseudo-­‐indexical	  ties.	  Traces	  are	  disorderly	  collected	  and	  arranged	  in	  predetermined	  patterns	  in	  order	  to	  ‘explain’	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  its	  human	  disasters.	  However,	  haruspices	  who	  benefit	  from	  exposing	  these	  pseudo-­‐indexical	  links	  in	  reality	  do	  not	  rationally	  explain	  anything.	  They	  limit	  themselves	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  culprit,	  and	  therefore	  satisfy	  the	  angry	  social	  demand	  of	  personal	  agency	  (Bratich	  2008).	  The	  migrants,	  the	  Jews,	  the	  Germans,	  the	  southern-­‐Europeans,	  the	  Protestants,	  or	  even	  imaginary	  lobbies	  such	  as	  the	  “Illuminati”	  are	  designated	  as	  responsible	  of	  the	  public	  distress	  (Taguieff	  2005).	  Traces	  are	  singled	  out	  and	  denounced	  that	  would	  point	  out	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  groups	  of	  individuals	  would	  purposefully	  generate	  financial	  and	  economic	  catastrophes	  in	  order	  to	  personally	  take	  advantage	  from	  them.	  However,	  indexical	  relations	  decried	  by	  modern	  divination	  are	  never	  demonstrated	  through	  solid	  evidence	  but	  rather	  emphasized	  through	  conspiratorial	  rhetoric.	  Analyzing	  and	  denouncing	  the	  internal	  mechanisms	  of	  such	  rhetoric	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  urgent	  tasks	  of	  semiotics.	  	  	  
9.	  Unveiling	  conspiracy.	  	  Umberto	  Eco,	  one	  of	  the	  fathers	  of	  contemporary	  semiotics	  and	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  semioticians	  of	  all	  times,	  has	  often	  dealt	  with	  the	  topic	  of	  conspiracy	  theories.	  Many	  of	  his	  novels,	  not	  to	  say	  all	  of	  his	  novels,	  revolve	  around	  this	  thematic	  kernel.	  In	  certain	  cases,	  conspiracy	  theories	  constitute	  the	  entire	  plot	  of	  the	  novel,	  like	  in	  Foucault’s	  Pendulum	  (1988),	  arguably,	  the	  best	  piece	  of	  fiction	  ever	  written	  on	  conspiracy	  theories,	  their	  internal	  dynamics,	  and	  social	  absurdities.	  Umberto	  Eco	  is	  also	  renown	  as	  one	  of	  the	  fiercest	  critics	  of	  Dan	  Brown.	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Apparently,	  indeed,	  the	  two	  authors’	  works	  resemble:	  they	  both	  draw	  on	  historical	  and	  cultural	  erudition	  in	  order	  to	  design	  intricate	  investigative	  plots.	  In	  reality,	  Eco’s	  and	  Brown’s	  approaches	  to	  mystery	  and	  conspiracy	  could	  not	  be	  more	  different.	  Eco	  narratively	  represents	  conspiracy	  theories	  so	  as	  to	  ridicule	  them,	  and	  encourage	  his	  readers	  to	  discard	  them	  as	  mere	  nonsense.	  Dan	  Brown,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  does	  not	  satirize	  conspiracy	  theories	  but	  fuel	  them,	  promoting	  their	  wider	  circulation	  in	  society	  and,	  what	  is	  even	  more	  disquieting,	  enhancing	  their	  epistemic	  status.	  Cooperative	  readers	  of	  Eco’s	  Foucault’s	  Pendulum	  are	  prompted	  to	  laugh	  at	  conspiracy	  theories;	  followers	  of	  Brown’s	  The	  Da	  Vinci	  Code	  are	  titillated	  into	  believing	  them	  and	  spreading	  their	  contagioniv.	  That	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  Eco	  has	  constantly	  criticized	  Brown.	  His	  critique	  bears	  a	  moral	  message	  that	  is	  visible	  not	  only	  in	  Eco’s	  novels	  but	  resonates,	  under	  a	  different	  guise,	  from	  his	  foundational	  theoretical	  work.	  If	  one	  had	  to	  summarize	  the	  core	  of	  Umberto	  Eco’s	  philosophical	  inquiry	  into	  one	  sentence,	  or	  slogan,	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that	  most	  of	  his	  work	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  investigate	  the	  limits	  of	  interpretation	  (1990).	  This	  inquiry	  entails	  two	  dimensions:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  theoretical	  line:	  showing	  that	  signs,	  texts,	  discourse,	  and	  culture	  in	  general	  are	  not	  always	  open	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  meaning,	  but	  produce	  signification	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  regulated	  by	  societies	  through	  established	  patterns.	  These	  codes	  of	  interpretation	  can	  be	  continuously	  negotiated	  and	  renegotiated,	  but	  nevertheless	  hold	  a	  central	  place	  in	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  meaning	  is	  created,	  shared,	  and	  circulated	  in	  societies.	  The	  second	  dimension,	  a	  moral	  one,	  intertwines	  with	  the	  first.	  Patterns	  of	  interpretation	  do	  not	  only	  exist;	  they	  must	  also	  hold	  for	  social	  communication	  to	  be	  possible.	  A	  society	  that	  does	  not	  share	  any	  codes,	  and	  does	  not	  impose	  any	  limits	  to	  interpretation,	  is	  a	  disintegrating	  society,	  where	  human	  beings	  are	  progressively	  deprived	  of	  what	  defines	  and	  enables	  them	  as	  social	  and	  political	  animals,	  that	  is,	  language.	  Eco’s	  theoretical	  stance	  and	  even	  more	  the	  hermeneutical	  ethics	  resulting	  from	  it	  have	  sometimes	  been	  labeled	  as	  conservative,	  or	  even	  reactionary.	  Nothing	  could	  be	  more	  wrong.	  Eco	  has	  been	  an	  outspoken	  critic,	  for	  instance,	  of	  the	  textual	  hermeneutics	  of	  religious	  fundamentalisms,	  especially	  when,	  adopting	  literalism,	  they	  claim	  that	  one,	  and	  only	  one	  interpretation	  of	  a	  sacred	  text	  is	  possible	  (Eco	  1992).	  This	  interpretive	  attitude	  only	  apparently	  sets	  rigid	  limits	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  text,	  considered	  as	  directly	  emanating	  from	  transcendence,	  can	  be	  used	  for	  the	  production	  and	  circulation	  of	  further	  meaning	  (Leone	  2012	  The	  Semiotics).	  In	  reality,	  denying	  that	  alternative	  interpretations	  of	  a	  text	  are	  possible	  is	  equally	  irrational,	  from	  Eco’s	  perspective,	  as	  affirming	  that	  any	  interpretation	  of	  a	  text	  is	  possible.	  The	  first	  claim	  rejects	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  cultural	  patterns	  encoding	  and	  
	   29	  
decoding	  social	  meaning	  might	  exist;	  the	  second	  admits	  this	  multiplicity	  but	  see	  no	  rational,	  inter-­‐subjective	  ways	  to	  choose	  among	  them,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  rank	  them	  (Leone	  Forthcoming	  On	  
Depth).	  Most	  of	  Eco’s	  theoretical	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  fictional	  counterpart,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sophisticate,	  monumental	  attempt	  to	  conceptually	  dismantle	  these	  positions	  while	  showing	  their	  burden	  of	  heavy	  moral	  consequences.	  How	  would	  societies	  in	  which	  these	  two	  hermeneutic	  lines	  predominate	  look	  like?	  A	  human	  group	  dominated	  by	  a	  fundamentalist	  interpretive	  ethics	  would	  most	  probably	  be	  a	  repressive	  one	  (Leone	  2014	  Sémiotique).	  Unfortunately,	  this	  scenario	  is	  not	  only	  fictional,	  but	  has	  received	  many	  embodiments	  through	  history.	  It	  is	  at	  work	  even	  in	  many	  contemporary	  societies.	  Wherever	  a	  sacred	  text,	  or	  a	  corpus	  of	  sacred	  texts,	  is	  institutionally	  held	  as	  the	  intangible	  pillar	  of	  society,	  an	  interpretive	  bureaucracy	  develops	  in	  order	  to	  link	  power	  and	  its	  control	  over	  individuals.	  Idiosyncrasies	  that	  do	  not	  align	  with	  the	  enthroned	  pattern	  are	  discarded,	  repressed,	  persecuted.	  Ways	  of	  life	  that	  do	  not	  conform	  with	  the	  rule,	  considered	  as	  straightforwardly	  descending	  from	  transcendence	  with	  no	  human	  mediation,	  are	  outlawed,	  banned,	  their	  bearers	  forcibly	  converted	  or	  exterminated.	  A	  society	  that	  adopts	  a	  fundamentalist	  interpretive	  hermeneutics	  is	  one	  that	  frustrates	  the	  innate	  human	  propensity	  for	  creativity	  and	  construction	  of	  infinite	  alternatives.	  However,	  Eco’s	  work	  points	  out	  with	  equal	  if	  not	  greater	  vehemence	  the	  risks	  resulting	  from	  a	  hermeneutical	  ethics	  that	  does	  not	  recognize	  any	  legitimate	  method	  for	  ranking	  interpretations.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  not	  only	  sacred	  texts,	  but	  also	  legal	  codes,	  not	  to	  speak	  of	  fictional	  narratives,	  are	  open	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  interpretation,	  with	  no	  boundaries	  being	  able	  to	  set	  a	  limit,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  range	  of	  limits,	  to	  such	  proliferation.	  As	  it	  is	  known,	  Eco	  has	  identified	  in	  a	  certain	  interpretation	  of	  Derrida’s	  deconstructionism,	  and	  mainly	  in	  the	  US,	  politicized	  version	  of	  it,	  the	  main	  source	  of	  such	  hermeneutic	  style	  (Eco	  1992).	  Nietzsche	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  its	  first	  modern	  advocate:	  only	  interpretations	  exist,	  not	  facts.	  One	  might	  wonder	  how	  a	  society,	  wherein	  this	  perspective	  predominates,	  would	  look	  like.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  a	  repressive	  society	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  fundamentalist	  society	  would	  be.	  No	  entrenched	  interpretive	  pattern	  would	  designate	  insiders	  and	  outsiders,	  rulers	  and	  outcasts.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  one	  might	  have	  the	  impression	  that,	  in	  a	  deconstructive	  society,	  anything	  might	  go,	  from	  sexual	  behaviors	  to	  literary	  taste,	  from	  legal	  interpretations	  to	  scientific	  findings.	  In	  this	  domain,	  nevertheless,	  Ronald	  Dworkin	  seems	  to	  join	  Eco	  in	  expressing	  a	  preoccupation	  about	  the	  heavy	  consequences	  that	  such	  deconstructive	  utopia	  might	  bear	  on	  the	  order	  of	  society	  (Dworkin	  1982).	  A	  hermeneutics	  without	  limits,	  indeed,	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  handle	  interpretive	  conflicts.	  Just	  imagine,	  with	  Dworkin,	  a	  judge	  that,	  while	  condemning	  a	  convicted	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to	  life	  sentence,	  would	  affirm	  that	  such	  sentence	  results	  from	  an	  interpretation	  of	  facts,	  but	  that	  other	  interpretations	  are	  possible.	  Or	  imagine	  a	  doctor	  prescribing	  a	  cycle	  of	  chemotherapy	  by	  adopting	  the	  same	  hermeneutic	  stance.	  Legal	  or	  medical	  victims	  of	  such	  interpretive	  attitude	  would	  be	  horrified,	  asking	  for	  juridical	  or	  medical	  redress.	  The	  example	  indicates	  that	  a	  society	  in	  which	  interpretations	  are	  never	  prioritized	  is	  neither	  a	  powerless	  society,	  nor	  one	  in	  which	  repression	  of	  the	  weaker	  magically	  disappears.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  a	  model	  of	  society	  in	  which	  repression	  and	  violence	  proliferate	  without	  a	  center,	  depending	  on	  irrational	  contagion	  (Leone	  Forthcoming	  Semiótica).	  From	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view,	  whereas	  fundamentalist	  power	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  detect	  and	  contrast,	  deconstructive	  power	  is	  not,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  managed	  by	  a	  specific	  bureaucracy.	  Power	  unbalance	  and	  injustice	  pop	  out	  randomly,	  according	  to	  patterns	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  map	  since	  they	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  a	  public	  agenda,	  but	  to	  private,	  unstructured	  biases,	  which	  are	  nevertheless	  easy	  prey	  of	  manipulation.	  Eventually,	  the	  most	  powerful	  agencies	  triumph	  in	  deconstructive	  societies	  as	  well	  in	  fundamentalist	  ones,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  more	  surreptitiously,	  without	  an	  army.	  One	  of	  the	  great	  contributions	  of	  Umberto	  Eco	  to	  discussion	  on	  this	  theme	  consisted	  in	  showing	  that	  both	  hermeneutical	  attitudes	  could	  be	  discarded	  not	  only	  in	  view	  of	  their	  essentially	  anti-­‐democratic	  political	  consequences	  (despotic	  repression	  /	  anarchist	  repression),	  but	  also	  in	  theoretical,	  and	  therefore	  objective,	  terms.	  Charles	  S.	  Peirce’s	  model	  of	  semiosis	  as	  interpreted	  by	  Eco	  offers	  the	  conceptual	  ground	  for	  promoting	  a	  society	  in	  which	  limits	  are	  neither	  imposed	  nor	  deconstructed,	  but	  rationally	  and	  inter-­‐subjectively	  negotiated	  (Eco	  1976).	  Peirce’s	  modeling	  of	  signification	  and	  meaning	  gives	  credit	  to	  two	  quintessential	  features	  of	  human	  cognition.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  on	  several	  occasions,	  human	  beings	  are	  innately	  inclined	  to	  meaning	  proliferation	  (Leone	  2011	  Potentiality).	  The	  diagram	  through	  which	  Peirce	  sought	  to	  capture	  this	  tendency	  is	  an	  open	  one.	  It	  is	  open	  to	  infinity:	  each	  sign	  points	  to	  a	  further	  sign,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth	  without	  possible	  halt.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  humans	  equally	  strive	  for	  stability:	  they	  crystallize	  semiosis	  into	  habits	  that	  guide	  human	  cognitions,	  emotions,	  and	  actions.	  The	  problem	  of	  the	  two	  interpretive	  lines	  exposed	  above	  is	  that	  they	  miss	  the	  dialectic	  between	  these	  two	  equally	  essential	  cognitive	  features	  and	  endorse	  only	  one	  of	  them.	  In	  fundamentalist	  hermeneutics,	  only	  one	  habit	  is	  selected	  as	  dominant.	  Semiosis	  is	  locked	  into	  a	  rigidly	  codified	  interpretant	  that	  is	  imagined	  as	  totally	  conforming	  with	  the	  inner	  structure	  of	  a	  sacred	  text.	  Any	  attempt	  at	  reactivating	  the	  engine	  of	  semiosis	  by	  introducing	  alternative	  interpretants	  is	  quashed	  though	  often	  violent	  hermeneutical	  bureaucracy.	  Human	  beings	  that	  live	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  single,	  canonized	  set	  of	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habits	  experience	  deep	  alienation.	  They	  are	  pushed	  to	  turn	  into	  machines,	  to	  which	  no	  alternatives	  are	  conceivable	  (Leone	  2012	  Breve).	  However,	  also	  the	  deconstructionist	  society	  misses	  the	  dialectic	  between	  semiosis	  and	  habits,	  although	  in	  this	  case	  only	  the	  former	  is	  emphasized,	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  discarded.	  For	  the	  political	  deconstructionist,	  any	  habit	  is	  a	  foe	  to	  be	  rejected	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  further	  semiosis.	  The	  beautiful	  creativity	  that	  humans	  express	  in	  contemporary	  poetry	  incarnates	  the	  utopia	  of	  a	  self-­‐ruled	  society,	  in	  which	  continuously	  proliferating	  differences	  magically	  compose	  into	  multifarious,	  iridescent	  harmony.	  This	  ethical	  and	  political	  stance,	  though,	  while	  praiseworthily	  reacting	  to	  conservatism	  and	  autocratic	  repression,	  neglects	  that	  poetry	  too	  has	  its	  rules	  and	  codes,	  and	  that	  humans	  tend	  to	  rank	  their	  poets	  as	  well	  as	  they	  rank	  their	  legal	  principles	  or	  economic	  recipes.	  But	  the	  worse	  consequence	  of	  adopting	  a	  deconstructive	  hermeneutic	  is	  not	  so	  much	  literary	  anarchy	  —	  which	  some	  could	  even	  find	  amusing	  —	  as	  cognitive	  instability.	  A	  life	  with	  no	  habits	  is	  an	  unbearable	  chaos.	  A	  society	  with	  no	  interpretive	  patterns	  is	  one	  where	  conflict	  is	  likely	  to	  emerge	  at	  every	  step,	  and	  at	  every	  step	  is	  likely	  to	  stay	  unresolved.	  Between	  a	  hermeneutic	  model	  that	  imposes	  a	  habit	  and	  thwarts	  any	  semiosis	  and	  a	  hermeneutic	  model	  that	  imposes	  semiosis	  and	  thwarts	  any	  habit,	  Eco’s	  semiotics	  promises	  a	  third	  way:	  developing	  a	  method	  that	  is	  able	  to	  dissect	  interpretations	  and	  rank	  their	  qualities.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  interpretive	  semiotics	  meets	  the	  philosophical	  needs	  of	  anti-­‐Nietzschean	  new	  realism	  since	  it	  provides	  its	  philosophical	  claim	  with	  a	  methodology.	  According	  to	  new	  realism,	  it	  is	  not	  true,	  as	  Nietzsche	  and	  his	  deconstructive	  interpreters	  would	  claim,	  that	  facts	  do	  not	  exist,	  and	  that	  only	  interpretations	  rule.	  The	  new	  realist	  philosopher	  stresses	  the	  relevance	  of	  reality,	  and	  therefore	  of	  facts,	  in	  guiding	  the	  moves	  of	  social	  life	  (Ferraris	  2012).	  The	  interpretive	  semiotician	  is	  not	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  facts,	  since	  per	  definition	  and	  disciplinary	  tradition	  semiotics	  focuses	  on	  semiosis,	  not	  on	  the	  ontology	  supposedly	  behind	  it	  (Eco	  1997).	  However,	  truthful	  interpretations	  are	  the	  facts	  of	  semiotics.	  The	  reality	  that	  new	  realist	  philosophers	  call	  for	  is	  nothing	  else,	  from	  the	  semiotic	  point	  of	  view,	  than	  the	  network	  of	  interpretive	  habits	  that	  a	  community	  inter-­‐subjectively	  and	  rationally	  accepts	  as	  guiding	  patterns	  at	  a	  certain	  stage	  of	  its	  historical	  and	  cultural	  evolution.	  One	  could	  even	  claim	  that	  the	  advantage	  of	  Eco’s	  semiotics	  over	  new	  realist	  philosophy	  is	  that	  the	  former	  better	  than	  the	  latter	  escapes	  any	  temptation	  of	  embracing	  a	  fundamentalist	  model	  as	  ruling	  habit.	  That	  is	  the	  case	  because	  what	  new	  realist	  philosophers	  call	  “reality”	  is,	  for	  semioticians,	  a	  particularly	  established	  pattern	  of	  interpretation.	  Semiotics	  therefore	  does	  not	  indiscriminately	  rejects	  Nietzsche’s	  affirmation,	  but	  qualifies	  it	  by	  insisting	  that	  interpretations	  can	  be	  ranked,	  and	  that,	  as	  Peirce	  first	  intuited,	  ranking	  of	  interpretations	  is	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what	  results	  into	  a	  feeling	  of	  reality.	  Two	  major	  issues	  are	  therefore	  at	  stake.	  First:	  what	  is	  the	  position	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  and	  their	  supporters	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  different	  hermeneutical	  attitudes	  exposed	  thus	  far;	  second,	  what	  is	  the	  specific	  contribution	  of	  semiotics	  in	  countering	  the	  risks	  of	  founding	  a	  society	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  conspiracy.	  The	  remarkable	  success	  of	  conspiracy	  theory	  in	  present-­‐day	  societies	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  relation	  to	  socio-­‐political	  and	  economic	  reasons	  only.	  A	  feature	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  that	  has	  frequently	  been	  overlooked	  is	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  give	  a	  certain	  aesthetic	  pleasure.	  Similarly	  to	  gossip	  or	  metropolitan	  legends,	  conspiracy	  theories	  also	  thrive	  on	  boredom.	  Those	  who	  receive	  formulations	  of	  these	  theories	  are	  snapped	  from	  the	  calm	  rationality	  of	  the	  mainstream	  media	  discourse	  and	  instantaneously	  transported	  into	  a	  new	  scenario,	  which	  resembles	  a	  crime	  novel	  or	  a	  spy	  movie.	  Confronted	  with	  a	  new	  conspiracy	  theory,	  the	  audience	  is	  led	  to	  embrace	  the	  belief	  that	  nothing	  is	  how	  it	  seems.	  There	  is	  always	  a	  deeper	  truth	  to	  be	  discovered	  under	  the	  surface	  of	  history.	  The	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  of	  this	  belief	  derives	  from	  a	  sort	  of	  micro-­‐empowerment.	  Psychologists	  know	  very	  well	  that	  the	  success	  of	  secrets,	  and	  the	  paradoxical	  impossibility	  of	  keeping	  them	  that	  results	  from	  it,	  stems	  from	  the	  pleasure	  that	  people	  feel	  when	  they	  are	  communicated	  something	  that	  is	  not	  of	  public	  domain.	  From	  gossip	  among	  friends	  to	  scoop	  magazines,	  such	  pleasure	  ultimately	  derives	  from	  the	  illusory	  idea	  of	  an	  inclusion,	  which	  also	  entails	  a	  corresponding	  exclusion.	  The	  communication	  of	  a	  secret	  immediately	  determines	  a	  separation	  between	  insiders	  and	  outsiders,	  between	  those	  who	  know	  about	  what	  really	  is	  going	  on	  and	  those	  who,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  keep	  living	  in	  blissed	  ignorance	  of	  reality	  (Quill	  2014).	  A	  corollary	  of	  this	  mechanism	  is	  that	  conspiracy	  theories,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  effective,	  must	  not	  be	  communicated	  through	  mainstream	  channels.	  They	  work	  insofar	  as	  those	  who	  receive	  and	  absorb	  them	  can	  cultivate	  the	  illusion	  that	  only	  they,	  and	  a	  small	  number	  of	  other	  adepts,	  are	  depositary	  of	  the	  truth.	  Most	  conspiracy	  theories,	  such	  as	  those	  claiming	  that	  there	  is	  a	  global	  lobby	  trying	  to	  enslave	  the	  human	  kind	  through	  chemicals	  released	  by	  planes	  (chemtrails	  conspiracy	  theory)	  are	  so	  unsupported	  by	  any	  scientific	  evidence	  that	  they	  are	  often	  easily	  ridiculed	  by	  the	  mainstream	  scientific	  and	  media	  discourse.	  However,	  such	  derision	  actually	  empowers	  conspiracy	  theories	  instead	  of	  denigrating	  them.	  For	  supporters	  of	  these	  theories,	  indeed,	  being	  ridiculed	  by	  the	  ‘ignorant	  mass’	  is	  further	  proof	  of	  belonging	  to	  an	  illuminated	  elite,	  to	  the	  group	  of	  the	  few	  who	  really	  know	  where	  the	  truth	  lies.	  The	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  at	  the	  core	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  is	  therefore	  that	  of	  a	  diversion	  from	  mainstream	  thought,	  which	  creates	  ipso	  facto	  a	  community	  of	  saved	  ones,	  entrusted	  with	  the	  mission	  of	  communicating	  truth	  to	  those	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enslaved	  by	  power	  and	  living	  in	  ignorance.	  This	  aesthetic	  effect	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  semiotic	  mechanism.	  Abstractedly	  speaking,	  it	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  deconstructive	  hermeneutics.	  As	  the	  hermeneutics	  of	  deconstruction	  rejects	  any	  interpretive	  habit,	  claims	  that	  every	  habit	  is	  an	  imposition	  of	  power,	  and	  operates	  for	  its	  dismantlement,	  so	  conspiracy	  theories	  insinuate	  that	  mainstream	  social	  and	  political	  beliefs	  are	  nothing	  but	  poisonous	  habits	  that	  powerful	  lobbies	  instill	  in	  citizens.	  Moreover,	  as	  deconstruction,	  so	  conspiracy	  thought	  aims	  at	  the	  reactivation	  of	  semiosis,	  mainly	  through	  denigration	  of	  mainstream	  truths	  as	  public	  lies.	  Nevertheless,	  one	  should	  underline,	  to	  the	  credit	  of	  deconstructionism,	  that	  an	  importance	  nuance	  differentiates	  this	  theoretical	  frame	  from	  the	  usual	  enfolding	  of	  conspiracy	  theories.	  Conspiracy	  theories	  are	  never	  poetic.	  They	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  every	  habit	  can	  be	  shattered	  through	  the	  continuous	  reactivation	  of	  unlimited	  semiosis,	  as	  Derrida’s	  poetics	  typically	  would	  suggest	  (Derrida	  1967).	  On	  the	  opposite,	  conspiracy	  theories	  more	  trivially	  replace	  a	  mainstream	  habit,	  supported	  by	  the	  scientific	  and	  socio-­‐political	  community,	  with	  a	  minority	  habit,	  which	  titillates	  the	  minority’s	  feeling	  of	  exclusivity.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  conspiracy	  theories	  borrow	  from	  deconstruction	  the	  idea	  that	  any	  counter-­‐argument	  can	  be	  dismantled	  by	  a	  further	  declination	  of	  the	  conspiracy	  theory	  itself,	  following	  a	  cyclical	  pattern.	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  above	  (what	  is	  the	  main	  hermeneutical	  attitude	  of	  conspiracy	  theorists?)	  is	  that	  conspiracy	  theories	  embrace	  a	  trivialized	  deconstructive	  attitude	  toward	  interpretive	  habits.	  They	  deconstruct	  mainstream	  beliefs,	  but	  only	  in	  order	  to	  merely	  replace	  them	  with	  cliquish	  alternative	  visions.	  Before	  dealing	  with	  the	  second	  issue,	  that	  is,	  the	  role	  of	  semiotics	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  conspiracy	  theories,	  the	  question	  should	  be	  raised	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  the	  aesthetic	  thrill	  attached	  to	  such	  alternative	  social	  thought	  is	  not	  equally	  distributed	  throughout	  history,	  but	  emerges	  with	  increased	  salience	  in	  certain	  specific	  social	  and	  cultural	  contexts.	  In	  other	  words:	  if	  secrets,	  rumors,	  and	  conspiracy	  ideas	  intrinsically	  give	  aesthetic	  pleasure,	  since	  they	  empower	  through	  the	  feeling	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  privileged	  minority	  of	  saved	  ones,	  why	  do	  conspiracy	  theories	  thrive	  only	  in	  certain	  periods	  of	  history?	  Answering	  this	  question	  is	  tantamount	  to	  formulating	  hypotheses	  explaining	  the	  success	  of	  deconstructive	  attitudes	  in	  history.	  Several	  orders	  of	  explanations	  are	  possible.	  Societal	  fragmentation	  is	  definitely	  an	  important	  element.	  The	  more	  the	  members	  of	  a	  society	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  isolated	  individuals,	  belonging	  to	  no	  socio-­‐cultural	  group	  in	  particular,	  adhering	  to	  no	  political	  organization,	  and	  deprived	  of	  any	  strong	  interpretive	  habits,	  the	  more	  they	  will	  be	  prey	  to	  conspiracy	  theorists	  who	  designate	  them	  as	  their	  new	  constituency,	  as	  members	  of	  an	  enlightened	  minority	  that	  must	  struggle	  to	  endure	  the	  ignorant	  subjugation	  of	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mainstream	  thought.	  In	  the	  present-­‐day	  European	  context,	  for	  instance,	  where	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  seen	  an	  inexorable	  decline	  of	  the	  framing	  power	  of	  traditional	  political	  formations	  such	  as	  parties	  or	  unions,	  new	  leaders	  were	  easily	  able	  to	  emerge	  and	  shape	  their	  constituency	  through	  the	  creation	  or	  circulation	  of	  conspiracy	  theories.	  In	  certain	  cases,	  the	  designation	  of	  a	  culprit	  enhances	  the	  individuation	  potential	  of	  these	  theories,	  since	  they	  federate	  a	  group	  against	  a	  narrative	  foe,	  as	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  earlier.	  However,	  a	  key	  element	  of	  success	  of	  contemporary	  conspiracy	  theories,	  which	  somehow	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  their	  modern	  and	  pre-­‐modern	  version,	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  need	  a	  culprit	  anymore.	  One	  could	  rather	  claim	  that	  the	  real	  culprit	  of	  present-­‐day	  conspiracy	  theorists	  is	  majority	  itself,	  the	  mainstream,	  and	  all	  the	  habits	  that	  crystallize	  a	  consensus	  in	  society.	  Semiotics	  is	  not	  a	  political	  tool.	  Semioticians	  are	  not	  supposed	  to	  engage	  in	  favor	  or	  against	  cultural	  and	  social	  attitudes.	  However,	  semioticians	  who	  analyze	  their	  societies	  cannot	  close	  their	  eyes	  either.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  must	  put	  their	  methodology	  at	  the	  service	  of	  public	  awareness.	  At	  the	  moment,	  such	  public	  awareness	  also	  includes	  the	  role	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  in	  the	  development	  of	  society.	  What	  kind	  of	  society	  is	  one	  in	  which	  conspiracy	  theories	  proliferate	  and	  their	  creators	  thrive,	  accumulating	  symbolical	  and	  political	  leadership?	  The	  consequences	  of	  the	  prevalence	  of	  a	  deconstructive	  hermeneutics	  in	  society	  has	  already	  been	  pointed	  out:	  a	  collectivity	  that	  does	  not	  provide	  itself	  with	  inter-­‐subjective,	  rational	  patterns	  for	  the	  consolidation	  of	  interpretive	  habits	  is	  inevitably	  a	  chaotic	  society,	  one	  in	  which	  conflicts	  constantly	  arise	  and	  are	  never	  recomposed.	  As	  it	  was	  underlined	  earlier,	  though,	  conspiracy	  thought	  and	  deconstruction	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  The	  former	  is	  a	  grotesque	  version	  of	  the	  latter,	  leading	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  demagogic	  despotism.	  A	  society	  dominated	  by	  conspiracy	  theories,	  indeed,	  is	  not	  only	  a	  conflictive	  society,	  where	  mainstream	  thought	  is	  continuously	  threatened	  by	  conspiracy	  alternatives.	  More	  dangerously,	  a	  conspiracy	  society	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  questioning	  power	  of	  deconstruction	  is	  systematically	  defused.	  Indeed,	  a	  society	  in	  which	  mainstream	  thought	  is	  never	  challenged	  by	  any	  alternative	  visions,	  which	  dismantle	  interpretive	  habits	  and	  reactivate	  semiosis,	  is	  an	  essentially	  despotic	  one.	  Critics,	  and	  semioticians	  among	  them,	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  challenge	  mainstream	  thought	  and	  beliefs.	  When	  that	  does	  not	  happen,	  society	  dangerously	  drifts	  toward	  fundamentalist	  hermeneutics.	  However,	  the	  problem	  of	  most	  popular	  conspiracy	  theories	  is	  that	  they	  challenge	  mainstream	  thought	  by	  imposing	  new	  interpretive	  habits	  whose	  construction,	  though,	  is	  supposed	  to	  never	  lead	  to	  a	  mainstream	  constituency.	  In	  other	  words,	  conspiracy	  theories	  are	  alternative	  versions	  of	  reality	  whose	  purpose	  is	  not	  that	  of	  introducing	  a	  new	  shared	  interpretive	  habit,	  but	  to	  have	  a	  conspiracy	  theory	  parasitically	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thrive	  on	  the	  back	  of	  mainstream	  thought.	  Conspiracy	  theorists	  do	  not	  want	  to	  supplant	  mainstream	  opinion	  leaders,	  for	  this	  replacement	  would	  eliminate	  the	  key	  element	  of	  their	  force,	  which	  is	  the	  capacity	  of	  titillating	  the	  public	  opinion	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  secrecy.	  The	  first	  potential	  danger	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  is	  therefore	  the	  tendency	  to	  disempower	  any	  sort	  of	  alternative	  vision	  of	  reality.	  Conspiracy	  theories	  apparently	  introduce	  more	  free	  thinking	  in	  society,	  but	  in	  reality	  they	  do	  so	  by	  rejecting	  a	  common	  communicative,	  inter-­‐subjective,	  and	  rational	  framework,	  entrenching	  themselves	  in	  a	  position	  of	  self-­‐indulgent	  minority.	  They	  therefore	  actually	  contribute	  to	  the	  unshakable	  nature	  of	  mainstream	  versions	  of	  realities.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  very	  probable	  that	  the	  CIA	  resorted	  to	  unconventional,	  debatable,	  and	  sometimes	  illegal	  methods	  of	  action	  throughout	  history;	  however,	  conspiracy	  theories	  that	  target	  the	  CIA	  do	  not	  actually	  threaten	  its	  operative	  grasp;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  they	  contribute	  to	  its	  unquestionable	  status.	  The	  worst	  consequence	  that	  stems	  from	  this	  attitude	  is	  that	  culprits	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  cannot	  be	  rationally	  defended,	  since	  they	  are	  accused	  by	  arguments	  that	  typically	  escape	  any	  rational	  scrutiny.	  That	  is	  particularly	  worrisome	  when	  culprits	  are	  not	  identified	  in	  the	  powerful	  agencies	  of	  society	  (the	  government,	  the	  secret	  services,	  the	  police),	  but	  in	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  minorities	  (the	  Jews,	  the	  Arabs,	  the	  migrants).	  Hence,	  the	  issue	  of	  determining	  the	  role	  and	  effect	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  in	  society	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  need	  of	  differentiating	  between	  critical	  and	  conspiracy	  theories,	  between	  deconstructive	  and	  conspiracy	  hermeneutics.	  Nevertheless,	  such	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  contents.	  It	  must	  be	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  argumentative	  patterns.	  Conspiracy	  theories,	  that	  is,	  do	  not	  show	  their	  nature	  in	  what	  they	  say,	  but	  in	  how	  they	  say	  it,	  in	  the	  specific	  rhetoric	  that	  they	  adopt	  in	  order	  to	  communicate	  an	  aura	  of	  secrecy,	  create	  a	  symbolical	  elite,	  and	  reproduce	  the	  separation	  between	  insiders	  and	  outsiders,	  which	  is	  instrumental	  to	  the	  parasitic	  existence	  of	  conspiracy	  leaders	  themselves.	  Here	  lies	  the	  main	  role	  of	  semiotics:	  singling	  out	  the	  rhetorical	  and	  argumentative	  lines	  though	  which	  conspiracy	  theories	  are	  created	  and	  maintained	  in	  the	  social	  imaginaire.	  	  	  
10.	  The	  end	  of	  semiotics.	  
	  The	  title	  of	  this	  concluding	  section	  has	  two	  contradictory	  meanings,	  like	  many	  responses	  of	  ancient	  divination.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  end	  of	  semiotics	  designates	  its	  termination.	  Semiotics	  as	  a	  discipline	  will	  end,	  despite	  having	  been	  one	  of	  the	  main	  sources	  and	  phenomena	  of	  revitalization	  of	  humanities	  in	  the	  contemporary	  epoch,	  if	  semiotics	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  refocus	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its	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  activities.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  worst	  scenario.	  What	  is	  worse	  is	  that	  the	  end	  of	  semiotics	  imperils	  the	  whole	  anthropological	  attitude	  that	  semiotics	  is	  about	  and	  turns	  into	  an	  academic	  endeavor.	  As	  this	  long	  essay	  has	  tried	  to	  demonstrate,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  semiotics	  lies	  the	  idea	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  gifted	  with	  alternatives,	  and	  these	  alternatives	  translate	  into	  an	  extraordinary	  variety	  of	  hermeneutics.	  The	  dream	  of	  thwarting	  the	  never-­‐ending,	  exuberant	  flourishing	  of	  semiosis	  is,	  it	  has	  been	  underlined	  several	  times,	  a	  dictatorial	  utopia,	  be	  it	  carried	  on	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  sacred	  text	  or	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  political	  ideology.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  against	  the	  lures	  of	  contemporary	  divination,	  semiotics	  equally	  rests	  on	  the	  conviction	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  also	  endowed	  with	  a	  rational	  talent	  for	  organizing	  meaning	  in	  society.	  Interpretations	  are	  not	  only	  individually	  crafted;	  they	  are	  also	  communicated.	  But	  what	  is	  communication	  without	  community?	  Without	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  members	  of	  a	  society	  voluntarily	  deprive	  themselves	  of	  some	  of	  their	  hermeneutic	  immunity	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  circulation	  of	  a	  gift	  (in	  Latin,	  “munus”),	  and	  determine	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  meaning	  can	  arise	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  habit	  (Esposito	  1998)?	  No	  man	  is	  an	  island,	  and	  no	  language	  is	  individual.	  Semiotics	  bets	  on	  the	  human	  capability	  for	  ranking	  and	  arranging	  interpretations,	  in	  the	  reading	  of	  a	  sacred	  text	  as	  in	  that	  of	  a	  political	  constitution.	  The	  intrinsic	  poetry	  of	  a	  fugue	  of	  interpretants,	  freely	  stemming	  from	  semiosis	  in	  the	  awestruck	  perception	  of	  nature,	  in	  the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  arts,	  in	  challenging	  the	  mask	  that	  each	  individual	  offers	  to	  social	  intercourse;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  crystalline	  beauty	  of	  a	  langue	  that	  grows	  like	  a	  sumptuous	  temple	  of	  marble,	  where	  each	  parole	  gives	  a	  fragment	  of	  contribution	  but	  disappears,	  befuddled,	  in	  the	  majestic	  movement	  of	  the	  semiosphere;	  liberty	  and	  necessity,	  the	  invention	  of	  symbols,	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  icons,	  the	  cogency	  of	  indexes:	  terminating	  semiotics	  as	  a	  human	  way	  to	  cognition	  and	  as	  a	  science	  studying	  it	  means	  yielding	  to	  an	  ideology	  that	  frustrates	  either	  of	  these	  two	  aspects:	  the	  capriciousness	  of	  meaning;	  its	  discipline.	  	   However,	  “the	  end	  of	  semiotics”	  also	  bears	  another	  meaning.	  It	  designates	  not	  the	  death	  of	  a	  field	  of	  knowledge	  but	  its	  ultimate	  goal.	  Given	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  semiotics	  has	  been	  understood	  in	  this	  essay,	  its	  intrinsic	  finality	  must	  be	  that	  of	  a	  double	  debunking.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  resisting	  those	  who	  claim	  that	  interpreting	  is	  not	  the	  quintessential	  operation	  of	  humanity.	  Neo-­‐positivists,	  fundamentalists,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  also	  reductionists	  and	  new	  realists	  all	  spouse,	  in	  different	  ways,	  the	  same	  crusade:	  defeating	  the	  interpreter;	  unmasking	  the	  travesty	  of	  all	  hermeneutics;	  persuading	  that	  the	  words	  of	  humanity	  repose	  in	  a	  granitic	  terra	  firma,	  be	  it	  the	  pseudo-­‐determinations	  of	  neurophysiology	  or	  the	  letter	  of	  a	  sacred	  text.	  This	  first	  debunking	  will	  aim	  at	  proving,	  not	  only	  through	  evocation	  but	  through	  actual	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demonstration,	  that	  a	  different	  way	  of	  meaning	  is	  always	  possible,	  and	  that	  the	  door	  of	  semiosis	  is	  always	  open.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  resisting	  all	  those	  who,	  among	  skeptics,	  conspirators,	  and	  new	  haruspices,	  mud	  the	  waters	  of	  meaning,	  claiming	  that	  no	  way	  exists	  to	  distinguish	  between	  what	  is	  caused	  and	  what	  is	  not,	  between	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  a	  symbol	  and	  the	  binding	  suggestion	  of	  an	  index.	  The	  difficult	  task	  ahead	  is	  made	  more	  difficult	  in	  times	  of	  social	  disintegration,	  when	  even	  the	  word	  of	  a	  friend	  doesn’t	  count	  anymore	  and	  people	  see	  ghosts	  everywhere.	  In	  these	  terrible	  times,	  the	  semiotician	  will	  give	  a	  new	  voice	  to	  the	  wind	  of	  rationality	  that	  blows	  through	  the	  Western	  world	  at	  least	  from	  the	  Greeks,	  and	  that	  blew	  through	  other	  winds	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  voice	  will	  say:	  there	  is	  infinity	  in	  interpretation,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  interpretation	  in	  infinity.	  Habits	  can	  be	  continuously	  negotiated	  and	  renegotiated,	  but	  this	  never-­‐ending	  struggle	  is	  not	  a	  hoax,	  since	  the	  innate	  human	  longing	  for	  companionship	  prompts	  it.	  Being	  together	  is	  sharing	  meaning.	  And	  this	  is	  how,	  from	  now	  on,	  semioticians	  will	  introduce	  themselves	  in	  parties:	  “I	  am	  a	  double	  debunker;	  I	  show	  people	  that	  meaning	  is	  infinite,	  and	  I	  show	  them	  how	  to	  cope	  with	  it”.	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  1987;	  Manetti	  2013.	  
ii	  Pliny	  the	  Elder,	  Naturalis	  Historia,	  35.15.	  Literature	  on	  this	  foundational	  myth	  is	  extensive.	  See	  Schmidt-­‐Linsenhoff	  1996;	  Stoichita	  1997,	  Suthor	  1999,	  Wolf	  1999.	  
iii	  Born	  May	  11,	  1947.	  
iv	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  and	  sophisticated	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  authors,	  Cobley	  2007.	  
